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WELFARE REFORM AND FAMILIES IN THE CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM
MORGAN B. WARD DORAN* & DOROTHY E. ROBERTS**
INTRODUCTION
There is little question that the sweeping changes in welfare pol-
icy initiated by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) 1 will have an impact on fami-
lies involved in state child welfare systems. Past research establishes
an association between welfare receipt and involvement with child
protection services.2 The primary goal of the PRWORA is to move
people from welfare to the workforce.3 This goal has the potential to
improve children's welfare by increasing poor families' income, but
also to increase child maltreatment by throwing families into eco-
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law.
** Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; Faculty Fellow, Institute for Pol-
icy Research. This project was supported by the Children and Family Research Center,
School of Social Work, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, which is funded in part
by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services. The authors would like to
thank Dan Lewis and Kristen Shook Slack for their help in developing this project and Lisa
Altenbernd, Elizabeth Gorenz, Emily Gorenz, Marla McDaniel, and Amber Stitziel Pareja
for their skillful interviews of respondents.
1. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp.
V 1999)).
2. Howard I. Bath & David A. Haapala, Intensive Family Preservation Services with Abused
and Neglected Children: An Examination of Group Differences, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 213,
218, 220 (1993) (presenting a study which found that 77% of the families referred to Child
Protective Services for neglect received some form of public assistance); see also DUNCAN
LINDSEv, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 4 (1994) ("Impoverished families . . . are, in over-
whelming numbers, relying on the child welfare system for help,"); LEROY H. PELTON, FOR
REASONS OF POVERTY 38 (1989) ("There is by now overwhelming evidence of a strong rela-
tionship between poverty and child abuse and neglect."); Elizabeth D. Jones & Karen Mc-
Curdy, The Links Between Types of Maltreatment and Demographic Characteristics of Children, 16
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 201, 213 (1992) (studying child abuse in light of specific demo-
graphic factors, and finding that there is a "strong connection between neglect, poverty
status and female-headed households"); Kristen Shook, Assessing the Consequences of Welfare
Reform for Child Welfare, POVERTY REs. NEWS (Joint Center for Poverty Research, Chicago,
IL), Winter 1998, available at http://www.jcpr.org/winter98/article2.html.
3. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 401 (a) (2)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601) (stating that one of the purposes of the Act is to "end the
dependence of needy parents on governmental benefits by promoting job preparation,
work, and marriage"); see also Ladonna Pavetti & Nancy Wemmerus, From a Welfare Check to
a Paycheck: Creating a New Social Contract, 20J. LAB. REs. 517, 518 (1999) ("To ensure that
state TANF programs emphasize work, PRWORA requires states to meet steadily increasing
work participation rates to receive their full TANF allocation.").
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nomic uncertainty.4 Many welfare recipient families have exper-
ienced a number of adverse life events, including economic strain,
parental stress, and inadequate child care,5 which make them more
vulnerable to charges of child maltreatment.6 In addition, the new
behavioral requirements that welfare reform imposes as a condition of
receiving benefits affect the parenting experiences of recipients who
are concurrently involved with the child welfare system. 7 These fami-
lies are at the intersection of two state programs that seek to modify
the behavior of poor parents.
The welfare and child welfare systems share overlapping histories,
philosophies, and client populations. The PRWORA eliminated the
federal guarantee of a basic income support for all families and re-
placed it with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), a
programmatic combination of work requirements and sanctions for
nonconforming behavior 8 TANF incorporates a system of financial
4. ROB GEEN & SHELLEY WATERS, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF WELFARE RE-
FORM ON CHILD WELFARE FINANCING (1997). The authors anticipate that PRWORA will
affect the child welfare system indirectly. They note that, because income level correlates
with incidence of child abuse, PRWORA may result in either increases or decreases in
levels of child abuse, depending on whether families' economic well-being improves or
declines. Id. at 5; cf Pavetti & Wemmerus, supra note 3, at 535 (concluding that welfare
reform's success or failure should be measured by its ability to respond not only to the
labor market, but also to the conditions of families who "have previously depended on the
welfare system for support"). But see Christina Paxson & Jane Waldfogel, Parental Resources
and Child Abuse and Neglect, 89 Am. ECON. REv. 239, 242 (1999) (stating that "the upward
trend in reports of child maltreatment may be spuriously correlated with trends in... the
rate of labor-force participation of mothers and the general increase in income levels").
5. See SARAH BRAUNER & PAMELA LoPREST, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, WHERE ARE THEY
Now? WHAT STATES' STUDIES OF PEOPLE WHO LEFT WELFARE TELL Us 8-9 (1999) (noting
that preliminary studies show that the average person who leaves welfare still has an in-
come below the poverty level, but concluding that the economic status of recipients is still
unclear); PAMELA LOPREST, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, FAMILIES WHO LEFT WELFARE: WHO ARE
THEY AND HOW ARE THEY DOING? 23 (1999) (examining the success of parents exiting the
welfare system, and noting that most parents work in low paying jobs, one-quarter of the
parents work night schedules, and over half of the parents struggle with coordinating child
care with their work schedules).
6. See Kristen Shook, Does the Loss of Welfare Income Increase the Risk of Involvement with the
Child Welfare System ?, 21 CHILD. &YOUTH SERV. REV. 781, 782 (1999) ("Psychosocial theories
of economic hardship and parenting predict that financial strain leads to heightened feel-
ings of stress and depression, or lower feelings of life satisfaction, self-efficacy and self-
esteem, which in turn diminish the quality of care that a parent provides."); id. at 803-09
(studying welfare parents' risk of involvement with the child welfare system, and finding
that stressful life events increase the risk of such involvement).
7. See generally ROBERT GEEN ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, WELFARE REFORM'S EIECT
ON CHILD WELFARE CASELOADS (2001). Families involved in both welfare and a child wel-
fare system may be affected by inadequate coordination between the two systems. See id. at
36.
8. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act §§ 101-116
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617, 619).
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punishments designed to deter disapproved behavior (e.g., out of
wedlock childbearing, dependence of needy parents on government
benefits) and to encourage approved behavior (e.g., marriage and ec-
onomic independence).' In addition, job-training programs seek to
improve recipients' attitudes about work.' ° State child welfare agen-
cies similarly use removal or the threat of removal of children to co-
erce parents charged with child maltreatment to comply with a set of
requirements that typically focus on curing perceived parental defi-
cits.1 Both the welfare and child welfare systems assume that poor
families' problems are caused by internal deficiencies that can be rem-
edied by improving parental behavior, rather than by external causes
that require social change. 12
Each system is designed to effect change through a combination
of rewards and punishments "that smacks of the behavioral science of
B.F. Skinner."'" Parents involved with the child welfare system must
attend parenting classes, enroll in drug-rehabilitation programs, pro-
vide drug samples, and participate in individual and family counseling
in order to keep or regain custody of their children.14 Similarly, par-
ents who receive welfare must find paid employment, attend job train-
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(e) (describing penalties against individual welfare recipients
who fail to meet work requirements); id. § 608(a) (enumerating various prohibitions on
the conduct of welfare recipients); see also Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48
U. KAN. L. REv. 229, 234 (2000) ("Like the rules of family law, the federal TANF program
and corresponding state welfare programs seek to regulate family behavior."); Martha Mat-
thews, Assessing the Effect of Welfare Reform on Child Welfare, 32 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 395, 399
(1999) (describing how families receiving TANF grants may be sanctioned if they do not
comply with work program requirements).
10. See Pavetti & Wemmerus, supra note 3, at 520 (stating that "sanctions have become
an increasingly important mechanism for reinforcing the importance of work... as they
provide workers with a concrete tool to hold recipients accountable for their actions").
11. See Laura Frame, Suitable Homes Revisited: An Historical Look at Child Protection and
Welfare Reform, 21 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 719, 742 (1999) ("In recent years child wel-
fare services and foster care have been viewed as protective interventions, shielding chil-
dren from the harms they may suffer from their parents.").
12. See Jill Duerr Berrick, From Mother's Duty to Personal Responsibility: The Evolution of
AFDC, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 257, 273 (1996) ("Rather than target the current debate
on the inadequacies of U.S. family policies, the minimum wage, wage supplements, or the
structure of the American economy, the welfare controversy focuses attention on individ-
ual women and their personal responsibilities."); Brito, supra note 9, at 244-50 (discussing
the varying degrees to which welfare parents and nonwelfare parents retain parental re-
sponsibility, and contending that PRWORA's work requirements prescribe parenting be-
havior); Alexia Pappas, Note, Welfare Reform: Child Welfare or the Rhetoric of Responsibility, 45
DUKE L.J. 1301, 1327 (1996) (describing a shift in government social policy "from policies
than ensure minimal child welfare to punitive measures intended to control parents'
behavior").
13. Paul Starobin, The Daddy State, 30 NAT'LJ. 678, 679 (1998).
14. Matthews, supra note 9, at 400.
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ing courses, and report to caseworkers in order to maintain benefits.15
In each program, parents who fail to comply with the stated require-
ments face financial and behavioral sanctions. These sanctions en-
force the social control and punitive functions of both the welfare and
child welfare systems. Threats of benefit reductions are used to influ-
ence the work, childbearing, and marital decisions of welfare recipi-
ents.16 Likewise, threats of child removal and termination of parental
rights are used to rehabilitate parents charged with maltreating their
children.
17
Despite the overlap in the populations served by the two pro-
grams, states have made little effort to coordinate their behavior-mod-
ifying requirements. As a result, TANF and child protection services
impose compound, and often conflicting, sets of requirements on par-
ents involved in both systems."8 It may be physically impossible for
parents to comply with the daily tasks that TANF and child welfare
agencies require. 9 More fundamentally, welfare reform and the child
welfare system implement conflicting philosophies about ideal moth-
erhood. While TANF lauds paid employment as the ultimate feature
of respectable parenting, child welfare agencies require mothers pri-
marily to nurture and protect their children.2" Parents involved in
both systems may find that the demands of keeping ajob conflict with
their ability to care for their children, especially given the lack of ade-
quate and affordable child care.21
This Article uses the findings of a qualitative study to explore the
convergence of these two behavior modification programs in the lives
15. Recipients must engage in "work activities," 42 U.S.C. § 607(e) (Supp. V 1999),
which include paid employment or job training. Id. § 607(d). In addition, welfare recipi-
ents may need to develop an "individual responsibility plan" and meet with a caseworker
on a regular basis. Id. § 608(b).
16. See id. § 602(a) (1) (A) (describing the requirements for state welfare plans, includ-
ing work requirements and programs designed to reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies).
17. See id. § 671(a) (describing the requirements of state plans for foster care and
adoption).
18. GEEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 35-36; Matthews, supra note 9, at 405.
19. See Matthews, supra note 9, at 405.
20. See Berrick, supra note 12, at 269-70 (contrasting the historical conception of moth-
erhood as work with current views that women's work consists of supporting their children
financially rather than staying at home).
21. See generally GEEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 31, 35 (describing how TANF work re-
quirements often conflict with child welfare requirements, especially mothers who miss




of poor families.22 Our study focused on families who both received
welfare and experienced involvement with the child welfare system-
so-called "dual-system families." We conducted in-depth, face-to-face
interviews with a subset of sixteen dual-system parents drawn from the
larger pool of families participating in the Illinois Families Study
(IFS). The IFS tracks a random sample of 1400 Illinois families who
received welfare benefits in 1998 for a six-year period. Our goal was to
examine the impact of welfare reform on the experiences of the fami-
lies in the IFS who are also involved with the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS). Our interviews confirmed that
the convergence of these two behavior modification programs places
competing demands on poor parents, making it difficult to meet the
expectations of either program. As a result, dual-system families are
uniquely burdened by excessive and, at times, contradictory social wel-
fare policies.
Part I of this Article describes the use of behavior modification
techniques in the welfare and child welfare systems. We examine the
historical emphasis of poor support on enforcing morality and the
modern trend toward using sanctions as a means of influencing wel-
fare recipients' work and family decisions. We also point out the
flawed stereotypes that fueled the recent changes in welfare law. Fi-
nally, this section describes the punitive approach of the child welfare
system implemented through threats to remove children or terminate
parental rights if parents do not comply with agencies' requirements.
In Part II, we discuss the overlap and conflict between the welfare and
child welfare systems. We argue that TANF's emphasis on sanctions
and work requirements, coupled with the lack of adequate child care,
make many welfare recipients more vulnerable to involvement with
the child welfare system. Moreover, the compounded and conflicting
requirements that each system imposes make it more difficult for
dual-system parents to comply with the expectations of either one.
Part III presents the methodology of our study and the characteristics
of our sample. In Part IV, we discuss how the parents we interviewed
experience the competing demands of the welfare and child welfare
systems. We conclude that the difficulty dual-system parents have in
caring for their children highlights the need for Congress to provide
better support for struggling families and to reexamine TANF's behav-
ior modification philosophy.
22. Morgan B. Ward Doran & Dorothy E. Roberts, The Impact of Welfare Reform on
Families Involved in Child Protective Services: Parents' Perceptions and Experiences
(2001) (unpublished study on file with authors).
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I. Two BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION SYSTEMS
Both the welfare and child welfare systems use behavior modifica-
tion techniques to coerce clients into conformance with state-ap-
proved parenting norms.2" From its inception, United States welfare
law attempted to impose moral standards on recipients and to shape
their behavior. 24 In this Part, we examine the origins of welfare's be-
havior modification philosophy, as well as its contemporary manifesta-
tion in welfare reform. We also discuss the parallel punitive approach
of the child welfare system.
A. The History of Welfare's Moral Regulation
Behavior modification techniques are not new to welfare law.
Welfare programs have historically sought to both provide support to
needy families and encourage parental self-sufficiency and morality.
The Mother's Pensions at the turn of the twentieth century explicitly
proscribed immoral behavior and afforded administrators of the pro-
gram wide latitude in judging recipients' compliance.2 5  This
penchant for enforcing moral behavior was preserved in the Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC) and Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) programs. While providing assistance to poor widows,
orphans, and mothers was the primary goal of ADC and AFDC, both
programs also sought to promote the prevailing social ideals.26
The Social Security Act of 1935 created ADC,27 a federal social
welfare program designed to ensure that the children of widows and
orphaned youth would not grow up in poverty. 28 ADC afforded short-
term minimum income support to mothers who had no other means
23. See Lucy Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Propos-
als, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 720-21 (1992) (stating that the idea behind state welfare reform
measures is: "only those women and children who conform to majoritarian middle-class
values deserve government subsistence benefits").
24. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED 45-46 (1994).
25. Id. at 43-49; JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE 119 (1994); Berrick, supra
note 12, at 261.
26. Professor Berrick has noted that:
[A]s with mothers' pensions, only certain kinds of mothers qualified for assis-
tance under the early AFDC program. Women with young children whose hus-
bands had died, divorced, or deserted them were commonly thought of as the
"deserving poor" because the circumstances of their poverty were outside of their
control. Conversely, the unfortunate woman who had a child outside of marriage
was often considered by public authorities as amoral or unfit .... [W] omen such
as these were normally disqualified from receiving public support.
Berrick, supra note 12, at 260 (footnote omitted).
27. Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (Supp. V 1999)).
28. See id. § 401.
2002]
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to provide for their children.29 However, as did the Mother's Pension
statutes before it, ADC incorporated an implicit condition of parental
fitness into its eligibility requirements.3 1 Only mothers who were "de-
serving" of assistance were allowed to enroll in ADC.3 1
Determinations of deservingness were based on the moral stan-
dards of the era. Indeed, Congress enabled states to consider the
"moral character" of the parent when determining aid for children
under ADC.32 For example, women of color and mothers of "illegiti-
mate" children were routinely denied support.33 These moral and ra-
cial requirements created an implicit "suitable home" restriction on
ADC receipt that the federal government formally enacted in 1940.14
Despite the assumptions of immorality and deviance that they were
based upon, the suitable home provisions had little overall impact on
"sexual activity, illegitimacy, and marriage and family stability" among
ADC recipients. 5 Although the Social Security Board and the Bureau
of Public Assistance eventually recommended that the restriction be
repealed in 1945,36 states continued to use birth status, moral charac-
ter of the mother, and condition of the home as criteria for ADC
29. See id. § 406(a).
30. See Frame, supra note 11, at 721-22. ADC "reflected an essential philosophy of fam-
ily preservation" that attempted to distinguish between poverty and child maltreatment.
Id. at 721. Poor children were to be kept with their families unless the parent(s) had
"unworthy parental character." Id. No effort was made, however, to define "worthiness";
rather, a common understanding of "immorality" was assumed. Id. at 721-22.
31. See, e.g., Berrick, supra note 12, at 261 (explaining how women's sexual behavior,
race, religion, and character were often factors for local caseworkers in determining
whether mothers "deserved" assistance); see also GORDON, supra note 24, at 37 (discussing
state assistance programs to "deserving" poor single mothers in the early 1900s and how
ADC adopted this model).
32. WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 29 (1965); see also Frame, supra note
11, at 725-26.
33. QUADAGNO, supra note 25, at 119-20. ADC was used to distribute benefits based on
race because Southern congressmen demanded that states have the right to establish eligi-
bility criteria to help determine who should receive benefits. See id at 119. This resulted in
white, widowed women being the majority of beneficiaries rather than single, divorced, or
deserted African-American mothers. Id.; seeJOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE
MORAL CONSTRUCrION OF POVERTY 105 (1991) ("[T] he Social Security Act... reinforce[d]
locally controlled social regulation of the undeserving poor- .. the unemployed male,
the dependent aged, and poor single mothers.").
34. See BELL, supra note 32, at 29-35. In 1940, the Bureau of Public Assistance issued an
official "suitable home" policy "that required state agencies to determine that conditions in
the home in which a child will live will protect the interests and promote the welfare of a
dependent child." Id at 35-36. The policy stated that "[m]any homes in which dependent
children now live do not conform to a minimum standard of decency and health." Id. at
36.
35. Roland J. Chilton, Social Control Through Welfare Legislation, 5 LAw & Soc'v REv. 205,
220 (1970).
36. BELL, supra note 32, at 51.
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grant decisions.3" ADC, though technically available to all children in
single-parent households, was in practice an income support program
exclusively for white widows.38 In 1960, reacting to protests against
the widespread denial of benefits to minority and nonwidowed single-
parent families, the Secretary of Health Education and Welfare issued
a policy statement directing states to abandon the suitable home crite-
ria for ADC receipt.3 9
In 1962, the "social service amendments" to the Social Security
Act renamed the ADC program "Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren" (AFDC).4 The new AFDC incorporated work incentives and
job training through the Work Incentive Program (WIN), which was
designed to usher families off the welfare rolls.41 WIN introduced a
system of inducements to work, and punishments for nonparticipa-
tion.4 2 However, the sanctions imposed under AFDC and the severely
criticized WIN program were often ambiguous, largely discretionary,
and seldom enforced.4" The elimination of racial and moral require-
ments was a factor in the AFDC program's enrollment increase from
three million recipients in 1960 to eleven million in 1975.44 As the
number of blacks in the welfare caseloads grew, "welfare dependency"
became stigmatized, work requirements increased, and effective bene-
fit levels were reduced.45
37. See generally id. at 93-110 (discussing states' use of "suitable home" requirements
between 1952 and 1960).
38. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 33, at 104-05 (explaining how women of color,
as well as divorced, abandoned, and unmarried mothers, were considered "undeserving
poor" and not a part of organized public welfare programs); QUADAGNO, supra note 25, at
119 (arguing that state administration of ADC funds led to racial discrimination).
39. Frame, supra note 11, at 728. In 1968, the United States Supreme Court took the
first step toward formally invalidating suitable homes provisions by nullifying "absent fa-
ther" rules, which denied benefits to AFDC recipients who cohabitate with a nonparental
male. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334 (1968) (holding that "destitute children who are
legally fatherless cannot be flatly denied federal assistance on the transparent fiction that
they have a substitute father" unless there is proof he is providing actual assistance). Sub-
sequent case law reiterated and extended the King holding, effectively prohibiting states
from assuming that nonlegally responsible lodgers in an AFDC home contribute financially
to the household. See Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338, 346 (1975) (invalidating a New
York regulation that reduced benefits on the assumption that a nonpaying male lodger was
contributing to the household); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 559-60 (1970) (upholding a
California regulation that treated the income of a man not married to the mother as un-
available to her children unless there was proof of support).
40. Berrick, supra note 12, at 259 n.10.
41. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 33, at 138-39.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 139 (explaining how the ambiguous and discretionary nature of the WIN
legislation produced "dismal results").
44. See id. at 113.
45. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BoDy 207 (1997).
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B. Welfare Reform: Behavior Modification Through Work Requirements,
Time Limits, and Sanctions
The PRWORA reflects the government's response to the public
perception that welfare was too generous and eroded core American
values.4 6 The law eliminated the federal guarantee of aid to poor chil-
dren and replaced it with TANF, a programmatic combination of
work requirements and sanctions for recipients' nonconforming be-
havior.4 7 The new welfare law was specifically designed to employ pu-
nitive techniques as a means to modify parents' behavior.4"
The PRWORA dramatically alters the way that states dispense
public assistance to the poor. At the administrative level, the
PRWORA offers financial bounties for states that are able to reduce
the number of families on welfare.49 These financial rewards provide
an incentive for state welfare administrators and street-level
caseworkers to discourage parents from initiating or continuing their
welfare receipt.5" At the individual level, TANF incorporates a system
of financial punishments that is designed to modify the behavior of
recipients. For example, parents are subject to nondiscretionary sanc-
tions for failing to work, attend school,5 1 or even for failing to meet
with their caseworker.52
1. Deterring Disapproved Behaviors.-Like ADC and AFDC, TANF
imposes a set of behavior requirements upon mothers as a condition
of federal assistance. The current welfare program addresses issues of
parental fitness and moral character through sanctions and benefit
reductions to modify the behavior of recipients.5 3 Welfare historian
Gwendolyn Mink writes that "[b] oth Democrats and Republicans em-
46. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, §§ 101, 103, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110-13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 601 (Supp. V 1999)); see also NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 65-77 (Ed
Gillespie & Bob Schellhaus eds., 1994).
47. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act §§ 101-116
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617, 619).
48. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 607-608 (detailing mandatory work requirements and correspond-
ing sanctions for noncompliance); see also Pavetti & Wemmerus, supra note 3, at 521 ("The
primary purpose of sanctions is to send a message that receipt of cash assistance carries
with it a set of expectations, especially regarding work.").
49. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (4), (5)(E).
50. See GORDON MERMIN & C. EUGENE STEUERLE, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF
TANF ON STATE BUDGETS 3 (1997).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)-(e).
52. See Evelyn Z. Brodkin, Inside the Welfare Contract: Discretion and Accountability in State
Welfare Administration, 71 SoC. SERV. REV. 1, 13 (1997) (explaining how caseworkers often
threatened clients with financial sanctions if the clients did not follow their instructions).
53. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 607-608.
[VOL. 61:386
2002] FAMILIES IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 395
phasized the wrongs of mothers-their 'unwillingness to work,' their
failure to marry (or stay married), their irresponsible sexuality and
childbearing."54 Prior to 1996, approximately half of the states had
applied for "waivers," which allowed states to depart from AFDC fund-
ing requirements and to use behavior modification strategies. These
states acted as early laboratories for federal welfare reform. Examples
of state waiver plans that focused on modifying parental behavior and
were incorporated into the federal legislation include New Jersey's
Wedfare 56 and Family Cap 57 programs, and Wisconsin's Workfare
58
and Learnfare programs.59
TANF permits states to implement child exclusion policies, or
"family caps," to reduce pregnancies among the recipient popula-
tion.6' Somewhat akin to the ADC prohibition against single mothers
having sexual relations while receiving government assistance,6" family
caps function as a loosely controlled behavioral deterrent. 62 Under
child exclusion policies, mothers who currently receive welfare bene-
54. GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S END 4 (1998).
55. Nan S. Ellis & Cheryl M. Miller, Welfare Waiting Periods: A Public Policy Analysis of
Saenza v. Roe, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 343, 343 n.8 (2000); Philip Harvey, An Analysis of
the Principal Strategies that Have Influenced the Development of American Employment and Social
Welfare Law During the 20th Century, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 677, 748 (2000).
56. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.4(b) (West 1993) (repealed 1997).
57. Id. § 44:10-3.5; see MICHAEL J. CAMASSO ET AL., A FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF
NEWJERSEY'S FAMILY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, at i-ii (1998) (evaluating the 1992 NewJersey
Family Development Program that included "family cap" provisions, which prohibit welfare
recipients from receiving additional benefits for a child conceived while on welfare, and
provisions similar to "Wedfare," which eliminate the marriage penalty and equalize bene-
fits for two-parent households); see also Ted George Goertzel & John Hart, New Jersey's $64
Question, in THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 109, 109-45 (Donald F. Norris & Lyke
Thompson eds., 1995) (describing the enactment and impact of the Family Cap program);
Williams, supra note 23, at 736 (describing the New Jersey Family Cap program).
58. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.147 (West Supp. 2001).
59. Id. § 49.26; see Thomas J. Corbett, Welfare Reform in Wisconsin: The Rhetoric and the
Reality, in THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM, supra note 57, at 19, 36-43 (describing the
passage and implementation of the Wisconsin Learnfare program); Williams, supra note
23, at 726-36 (describing the Wisconsin Learnfare program). Other states also designed
experimental welfare programs. See Donald F. Norris & Lyke Thompson, Findings and Les-
sons From the Politics of Welfare Reform, in THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM, supra note 57, at
215, 221-26 (examining the laws of California, Maryland, Michigan, NewJersey, Ohio, and
Wisconsin).
60. Brito, supra note 9, at 241 & n.47.
61. See Frame, supra note 11, at 725 (noting that, in the early 1900s, women who had
"unmarried relationships with men" were often denied aid).
62. See Brito, supra note 9, at 241-42 (observing that family caps are used to deter wo-
men on welfare from having additional children, and noting that family caps are predi-
cated on the assumption that welfare intrinsically encourages poor women to have
children); see also Vicki Lens, Welfare Reform and the Family Cap: Rhetoric Versus Reality, 4J.
CHILD. & POVERTY 19, 26-30 (1998) (examining the theory behind the family cap and
claims that reducing benefits will deter women on welfare from having more children).
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fits and give birth to a child (or children) do not receive an increase
in the amount of their grant.63 Thus, the family cap acts as a form of
punishment for an unwanted result-pregnancy-as a means to deter
that behavior. Although the effectiveness of family caps at deterring
pregnancy is under study,64 it is clear that this policy reduces the
amount of benefits for many children born to welfare-dependent
families.65
In addition, TANF attempts to curtail the independence of teen-
age recipients and punish drug use among recipients. Minors under
the age of eighteen may be denied cash assistance unless they agree to
live with a parent, adult relative, or legal guardian.66 If a responsible
adult is not available, the minor must rely upon the welfare agency to
locate one.6 7 TANF also provides that individuals convicted of drug-
related felonies after 1997 will suffer a lifetime prohibition from re-
ceiving both TANF and food-stamp benefits, although states may opt
out of or modify this prohibition.6"
2. Work Requirements and Time Limits.-The centerpiece of TANF
is the requirement that all able parents work in return for the govern-
ment's financial support.6 ' TANF is intended to provide only short-
term assistance to families until the primary caregiver finds paid em-
ployment.7 1 In keeping with the emphasis on threatened punishment
as a tool of behavior modification, work is mandatory under TANF,
and noncompliance generates sanctions.71
Welfare receipt under TANF is limited to a five-year lifetime max-
imum.7 2 Further, all capable adults must find ajob within twenty-four
63. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.5 (West 1992) (repealed 1997).
64. See CAMASSO ET AL., supra note 57, at 244 (finding that the New Jersey Family Devel-
opment Program resulted in birth rates between 9% and 12% lower than the control
group for women participating in the program); Lens, supra note 62, at 31 (concluding
that no currently available evidence proves that the family cap will reduce out-of-wedlock
births, and arguing that the family cap ignores changes regarding out-of-wedlock births in
society as a whole).
65. See Lens, supra note 62, at 33.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (5) (A) (Supp. V 1999).
67. Id. § 608(a) (5) (B) (i).
68. 21 U.S.C. §§ 862, 862b (2000).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1) (A) (ii) (Supp. V 1999) (providing that state family assis-
tance programs must "[r]equire a parent or caretaker receiving assistance under the pro-
gram to engage in work").
70. See id. § 608(a) (7) (limiting assistance to a period not to exceed five years).
71. Id. § 607(e); see also Pavetti & Wemmerus, supra note 3, at 520-21 (explaining that
sanctions for noncompliance have always been utilized in welfare-to-work programs, but
that TANF allows states to strengthen their sanctions).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (7).
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months of their initial receipt of federal aid or risk termination of
benefits.73 To facilitate compliance, states may require recipients to
engage in work-related activities or specific work-program mandates. 4
The PRWORA allows states to modify federal requirements by obligat-
ing recipients to work within a shorter period of time.7 5 States may
also exempt twenty percent of their caseloads from the time limits and
work requirements for extreme hardship, battery, or cruelty.
76
Underlying TANF's work requirements and time limits are a set
of assumptions regarding the financial and cognitive benefits associ-
ated with work as opposed to welfare receipt. This position considers
welfare receipt in and of itself-independent of economic and socio-
demographic factors-as a negative force on family functioning and
child development.7 7 According to this theory, welfare undermines
recipients' motivation and self-esteem by discouraging work and rein-
forcing recipients' negative perceptions about their ability to provide
for their children. 7 1 In turn, this theory posits that the combined ef-
fects of less effective parenting and the absence of a positive parental
role model harm the children of welfare recipients.79 Supporters of
welfare reform contend that, by encouraging parents to work, TANF
73. Id, § 602(a) (1) (A) (ii).
74. Id. (authorizing states to develop plans for assistance that "[riequire a parent or
caretaker receiving assistance under the program to engage in work (as defined by the
State) ").
75. Id. (allowing states to require work before the 24-month limit if the State deter-
mines that the recipient "is ready to engage in work"). States may also use their own funds
to provide assistance after the five-year limit. Pavetti & Wemmerus, supra note 3, at 521. As
Pavetti and Wemmerus have explained:
As of October 1997, 26 states had adopted a 60-month limit and 19 states had
adopted a limit shorter than 60 months (including some states that had adopted a
periodic time limit such as 24 out of 60 months). One state adopted an individu-
alized time limit with no absolute limit specified in state law. Four states planned
to continue to provide reduced benefits to families after 60 months and one state
had not adopted any time limits.
Id. at 521-22.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (7) (C).
77. See LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZEN-
SHIP 41 (1986) ("People . . . feel less need to fulfill work and family obligations once gov-
ernment is willing, in effect, to do it for them."); Brito, supra note 9, at 247 ("The clear
message now is that what children need is financial support from their parents (rather
than from the state) and that the financial support trumps the parental nurturing role.");
Williams, supra note 23, at 719-21 (describing the rhetoric of the welfare reform debate).
78. See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 147-66 (1984); see also Williams, supra note
23, at 725.
79. See generally Thomas L. Hanson et al., Economic Resources, Parental Practices, and Chil-
dren's Well-Being, in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR 190, 190-92 (Gregj. Duncan &
Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1997) (describing the problems of children from economically
disadvantaged homes).
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positively affects recipients' self-perception and confers cognitive and
social benefits to their children. 0
3. Sanctions.-Sanctions are used in TANF to facilitate compli-
ance with work requirements. 81 ,Recipients who do not fully partici-
pate in a given state's job assistance program, called "Work First" in
many states s2 or who reach the twenty-four-month limit for receipt
without work, are subject to sanctions.8 3 In addition to these work-
based sanctions, the PRWORA mandates that states institute a lifetime
ban on all TANF and food stamp benefits to any individual who is
convicted of a felony involving a controlled substance.84 This
mandatory sanction is especially significant to child welfare programs
in states with major cities like Illinois, where forty percent of all child
maltreatment reports involve children who are exposed to drugs.s5
Some states also require welfare recipients to enter into "personal re-
sponsibility agreements" that are used to generate sanctions even if
the parent did not violate any formal welfare rules.8 6 Failure to con-
sent to the personal responsibility agreement is, in and of itself, a
sanctionable offense.8 7 Finally, sanctions may also be imposed by
caseworkers for perceived uncooperativeness on the part of
recipients.8 8
According to 1999 figures, "36 states now impose 'full-family sanc-
tions' for initial or continued noncompliance" with work programs,
under which "a family's entire cash assistance grant is eliminated. 89
Fourteen of these states impose a full-family sanction as the initial
penalty for noncompliance with state program requirements.9"
Nineteen states, however, use partial sanctions first.91 These states re-
80. See, e.g., Matthews, supra note 9, at 398 (noting that studies suggest children's well-
being and intellectual attainment improve when their mothers become employed).
81. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and En-
trepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1121, 1157 (2000) (noting that "[w]ork require-
ments generate a steady stream of opportunities for the imposition of sanctions").
82. See Pavetti & Wemmerus, supra note 3, at 518.
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1) (A) (ii) (Supp. V 1999); see also Pavetti & Wemmerus, supra
note 3, at 521 (noting states' efforts to strengthen sanctions to reinforce the importance of
work).
84. See 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2000).
85. Richard P. Barth, The Juvenile Court and Dependency Cases, FUTURE CHILD., Winter
1996, at 100, 103.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 608(b)(3) (Supp. V 1999); Diller, supra note 81, at 1157-58.
87. Diller, supra note 81, at 1158.
88. See Brodkin, supra note 52, at 31 n.36 (defining "noncooperation" as a sanctionable
offense that is largely a matter of caseworker discretion).
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duce the family grant or eliminate the adult portion of the TANF
award as a warning to families that compliance is necessary to con-
tinue receiving benefits.
9 2
Sanction rates reflect the economic and employment conditions
that differ state by state. One study of post-TANF recipients in Mary-
land found that, after nine months of the program, less than five per-
cent of clients received a full-family sanction.9 3 In contrast, an
examination of welfare reform in Delaware found that fifty percent of
all recipients received some form of sanction after the implementa-
tion of TANF. 94 Another study found that, "[d]uring one three-
month period, almost forty percent of recipients who left welfare na-
tionally did so because of sanctions."9 5
C. Myths and Stereotypes: The Weak Factual Foundation for
Welfare Policies
Welfare reform's emphasis on behavior modification techniques
is shaped by stereotypes about the typical welfare recipient rather than
the goal of improving the lives of poor families.9 6 Through the sanc-
tions and time limits imposed under TANF, the PRWORA attempts to
coerce recipients into what lawmakers consider the social main-
stream.9 7 However, provisions like the family cap, Learnfare, and
92. Id.
93. MARYLAND DEP'T OF HUMAN RESOURCES, LIFE AFTER WELFARE: AN INTERIM REPORT,
at iv (1997).
94. Pavetti & Wemmerus, supra note 3, at 521.
95. Diller, supra note 81, at 1159-60.
96. See, e.g., Stephen Lofredo, Poverty, Democracy, and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L.
REv. 1277, 1338 (1993) ("In the case of the poor, [the lack of a political voice] has too
often allowed political discourse to degenerate into mindless scapegoating and dehuman-
izing stereotypes."); Robert D. Bomersbach, Note, New Jersey's Bryant Amendment, 15 Wo-
MEN'S RTS. L. REP. 169, 174 n.66 (1993-94) ("The poor are seen as unwilling to work unless
compelled to do so, incompetent, dishonest, and irresponsible with regard to family and
community obligations alike."); id. at 174 (noting that current welfare laws "focus[ ] on the
behavior of the individual who, if impoverished, is perceived to have done something
wrong").
97. See Kathryn R. Lang, Fair Work, Not "Workfare". Examining the Role of Subsidized Jobs in
Fulfilling States' Work Requirements Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act
of 1996, 25 FoRDHAM UPs. L.J. 959, 972-73 & n.84 (1998) (discussing a school of reformers
who see work as "an essential feature of citizenship" and who believe that "[b]ringing the
isolated ghetto poor back into the mainstream society requires enforcing the work ethic"
(quoting MicuEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY 104-05 (1992))); Williams, supra note 23, at
720-21 (arguing that the idea behind state demonstration projects such as "Learnfare" or
"Wedfare" is that only women who conform to middle-class values deserve assistance); see
generally Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Auton-
omy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13, 17 (1999) (suggesting that
"[p]olicy makers argue that the goal should be independence, and favor the termination
of subsidy so the individual can learn to be self-sufficient"); Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites
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Wedfare carry clear assumptions about the morality and motivations
of welfare recipients.98 These behavior modification provisions are
premised upon a stereotyped understanding of the typical welfare
family. They stem from the view that welfare recipients are "dysfunc-
tional and deviant members of society because they cannot support
themselves."99 The PRWORA's wholesale adoption of these stereo-
types serves to "reinforce[ ] the myth that social problems . . . are
caused by the deviant behavior of welfare recipients"' ° rather than
historical problems such as racial discrimination and socioeconomic
disadvantage.' 0 ' Despite their prominence in the text and spirit of
the PRWORA, little evidence exists to support these myths.
10 2
For example, child exclusion policies are based on the assump-
tion that women receiving welfare are incapable of making responsi-
ble childbearing decisions and are enticed to have additional children
by the incremental increase in benefits.0 3 Empirical studies demon-
strate, however, that there is no significant correlation between wel-
and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FoRDHaM URs.
L.J. 1159, 1174 (1995) (discussing the role of the media in perpetuating stereotypes of
welfare mothers, and arguing that these stereotypes ultimately affect the decisions of policy
makers).
98. See Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna to Proletariat: Constructing a New Ideology of Mother-
hood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV. 415, 425-35 (1999) (stating that "welfare poli-
cymaking continues to be dominated by race-based and gender-based assumptions").
99. Laura M. Freidman, Comment, Family Cap and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doc-
trine: Scrutinizing a Welfare Woman's Right to Bear Children, 56 OHIo ST. L.J. 637, 657 (1995).
100. Williams, supra note 23, at 727.
101. Id. at 719. Conservative politicians and supporters of welfare reform "claimed that
the welfare initiatives of the 1960's are responsible for the persistence of poverty in the
United States" rather than "the structural problems of our society." Id.; see also Lucie E.
White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency" From a Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961,
1963 (1993) ("According to this myth, it is welfare policy-rather than the more complex
historical, structural, economic, and psychocultural dynamics of poverty-that causes fami-
lies, especially those headed by women, to be and to remain poor.").
102. See Robert Moffitt, Welfare Reform: An Economist's Perspective, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
126, 132 (1993). The following are "popular beliefs about behavioral effects of the welfare
system [under AFDC]:
(1) that it serves as a severe disincentive to work
(2) that it encourages long-term dependency on welfare
(3) that it encourages marital breakup and illegitimacy
(4) that it encourages state-to-state migration to take advantage of higher benefits
(5) that welfare is 'passed down' from generation to generation .... "
Id. However, "little evidence exists to support any of these beliefs, with the possible excep-
tion of the first." Id.
103. April L. Cherry, Social Contract Theoy, Welfare Reform, Race, and the Male Sex-Right, 75
OR. L. REV. 1037, 1094 (1996); Martha F. Davis, The New Paternalism: War on Poverty or War
on Women?, I GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 88, 90 (1993).
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fare receipt and increased childbearing."°4 To the contrary, welfare
mothers are less likely than other mothers "to have multiple
pregnancies and more likely to use contraception."' 05 Moreover, wel-
fare families do not have more children than nonwelfare families.10 6
Similarly invidious assumptions motivate the so-called Wedfare or
Bridefare program.'0 7 Bridefare attempts to encourage two-parent
marital families by increasing the cash benefit of welfare recipients if
they marry108 This provision assumes that any two-parent family is
better than a single-parent family, regardless of a parent's abilities and
desires.0 9 It also sends a message to unmarried welfare recipients
that their behavior is deviant, and that the state does not consider
them to be capable parents." 0 Under welfare reform, decisions con-
sidered to be private, constitutionally protected choices for other citi-
zens are the subject of government coercion for welfare recipients." 1
104. See GREGORY Acs, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF AFDC ON YOUNG WOMEN'S
CHILDBEARING DECISIONS 16-17 (1993) (presenting data showing little relationship between
births to low-income women and AFDC benefits); Davis, supra note 103, at 90 ("National
and local studies have demonstrated no positive relationship between the level of welfare
benefits and pregnancy .. "). Women receiving AFDC benefits and non-AFDC middle-
class women share the same reasons for childbearing. These reasons include "the belief
that a child solidifies a relationship with the father, the assumption that children represent
an economic value .. .a sense . . . that having a child gives [life] value and meaning, and
the desire to give a grandchild to one's own mother." Williams, supra note 23, at 738-39
(footnotes omitted). Moreover, non-AFDC, middle-class women do not "have children
only when they are economically able to support them," which is another assumption of
child exclusion policies. Id.
105. JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 106 (1995) (emphasis omit-
ted). In 1980, under 10% of the families receiving welfare had more than three children.
Williams, supra note 23, at 738.
106. Pappas, supra note 12, at 1319.
107. See Nina Perales, A "Tangle of Pathology": Racial Myth and the New Jersey Family Develop-
ment Act, in MOTHERS IN LAw 250, 263-64 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds.,
1995) (contending that Bridefare and the child exclusion provisions are based on a stereo-
type of women of color as being "irresponsible brood sow[s]" and "castrating matriarch [s]
who scorn[ I valid offers of marriage").
108. Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 569, 590 (2001).
109. See Will Marshall & Elaine Ciulla Karmack, Replacing Welfare with Work, in MANDATE
FOR CHANGE 217, 226 (Will Marshall & Martin Schram eds., 1993) (stating that many state
welfare reforms are premised on "recognition of the importance of the two-parent fam-
ily"); see also Cherry, supra note 103, at 1086 (stating Congress's assumption "that two-par-
ent families are the source of culture and social order, social stability, economic self-
sufficiency, and core social values"); Davis, supra note 103, at 91 (explaining that some
legislators believe "mother-only families are merely 'mother-child family fragments,' that
can only be made whole with the addition of a father"); Martha L. Fineman, Images of
Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274, 287 (contending that single motherhood is
viewed as a disease and a threat to the foundation of society).
110. Brito, supra note 9, at 236, 247; Davis, supra note 103, at 89.
111. Brito, supra note 9, at 241.
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Legislatures and courts treat welfare receipt as a waiver of basic pri-
vacy rights, permitting the state to penalize poor mothers for repro-
ductive and parental behavior that violates prescribed norms." 2
These myths about welfare recipients' sexual and reproductive
deviance were bolstered by powerful racial imagery. The stereotype of
the shiftless "welfare queen," who deliberately becomes pregnant to
fatten her welfare check and then squanders it on drugs, helped to
garner support for welfare reform. 1 3 According to sociologists Joel
Cazenave and Kenneth Neubeck, "Clinton and other politicians were
able to successfully play the welfare 'race card' by exploiting popular
welfare racist attitudes that were well documented by polling and
other data.""' 4 The black welfare queen embodies the reproductive
irresponsibility and maternal neglect that welfare dependency was
supposed to promote and is used to legitimize welfare's behavior-mod-
ifying role."1
5
D. The Child Welfare System's Punitive Approach
Like welfare reform, the child welfare system uses punishments
and rewards to gain clients' compliance with its behavioral rules.
Child protection agencies focus on "fixing" parents' deficits rather
than addressing the systemic causes of child maltreatment."' 6 Parents
who do not reform their behavior face the threat that their children
will be removed and their parental rights terminated." 7 Child welfare
agencies and judges typically give parents a case plan that lists require-
112. Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 205 YALE L.J. 1563,
1579-81 (1996) (book review).
113. See ROBERTS, supra note 45, at 17-19; Brito, supra note 98, at 415; Noel A. Cazenave
& KennethJ. Neubeck, Fighting Welfare Racism, POVERTY & RACE, Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 1, 1; see
also Williams, supra note 97, at 1167-68 n.47 ("People still believe that old lie that AFDC
mothers keep on having kids just to get a bigger welfare check . . . are immoral . . . lazy,
misuse their welfare checks, spend it all on booze, and are stupid and incompetent." (quot-
ingJohnnie Tillman, Welfare Is a Women's Issue, in AMERICA'S WORKING WOMEN 357 (Linda
Gordon & Susan Reverby eds., 1976))).
114. Cazenave & Neubeck, supra note 113, at 1.
115. See Williams, supra note 97, at 1160-61 & n.9 (describing how the account of a
stereotypical welfare mother influenced the passage of a stringent welfare reform bill in
Massachusetts).
116. See LINDSEY, supra note 2, at 4-5 (describing the "residual approach" to child wel-
fare, which waits until families are in crisis for intervention); PELTON, supra note 2, at 27
(describing the psychodynamic model of child abuse that focuses on the treatment of par-
ents' psychological defects).
117. See Naomi R. Cahn, Children's Interest in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care, and
Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189, 1202 (1999). Many states have instituted programs that
are highly punitive to families. Recipients must comply with requirements of their case
plan or face termination of parental rights. Id. Moreover, the burden of showing signifi-
cant progress and compliance is on the natural parent. Id.
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ments they must complete to keep their children at home or regain
custody of those placed in substitute care."'8 Parents are often re-
quired to enroll in multiple services, such as drug treatment, psycho-
logical counseling, and parent training classes." 9 Parents typically
rely on public transportation to get to these mandated appoint-
ments.1 20 Moreover, a judge's requirement of particular services does
not mean that they are readily available. Drug treatment programs,
for example, especially those that allow children to reside with their
mothers, have extensive waiting lists.
1 21
Like welfare reform, the child welfare system hides the systemic
reasons for families' hardships by laying the blame on individual par-
ents' deviant behavior. Sociologists Andrew Billingsley and Jeanne
Giovannoni explain, "[t]he underlying philosophy of the present
child welfare system is that all families should be able to function ade-
quately without the assistance of society and that failure to perform
the parental role without such assistance is indicative of individual pa-
thology.' 22 Because the system attributes child maltreatment to pa-
rental failings, state intervention to protect children is punitive in
nature. Caseworkers take on a dualistic role of investigating, coercing,
and penalizing the families they are supposed to help.'12  The
caseworker, notes Duncan Lindsey, has been "unmistakably cast in the
role of inquisitor, prying into and judging the affairs of the family with
predictably adverse effects on the family. 124
Recent developments in federal child welfare policy threaten to
intensify this punitive approach. President Clinton signed the Adop-
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (describing the contents of a case
plan); see also David J. Herring, The Adoption and Safe Families Act-Hope and Its Subversion,
34 FAm. L.Q. 329, 332-33 (2000) (describing the requirement that states develop family
case plans and a system to monitor progress).
119. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PARENTAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE: IMPLICATIONS
FOR CHILDREN, THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM, AND FOSTER CARE OUTCOMES 8 (1997) (stating
that reunification is more likely if "the full range of needs of the mother are addressed").
120. See Kathleen A. Bailie, Note, The Other "Neglected" Parties in Child Protective Proceed-
ings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 FoRDHAM L. REv.
2285, 2296-97 (1998) (noting that the very deficiencies that cause charges of neglect, such
as lack of transportation, prevent welfare parents from complying with the service plan); see
also Lang, supra note 97, at 974 (stating "that health care, child care, and transportation are
the three most substantial barriers to [welfare recipients] participation in [work]
programs").
121. See Cahn, supra note 117, at 1203-04 (explaining that funding shortages and high
caseloads prevent welfare programs from offering sufficient services).
122. ANDREW BILLINGSLEY & JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI, CHILDREN OF THE STORM, at viii
(1972).
123. See PELTON, supra note 2, at 118-20; Brodkin, supra note 52, at 13-14 (discussing
caseworkers' dual role of "counselor and cop").
124. LINDSEY, supra note 2, at 98.
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tion and Safe Families Act (ASFA) into law in November 1997.2'
Based largely on a reactionary response to the most egregious cases of
child abuse reported in the popular media, ASFA radically trans-
formed the focus of federal child welfare policy. 126 In contrast to the
emphasis on family reunification that characterized its predecessor,
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA),' 2 7
ASFA elevates the health and safety of children above all other con-
cerns.1 2  Indeed, ASFA's reform of federal child welfare policy
reaches beyond its stated goal of protecting children and creates a
legislatively mandated preference for adoption' 29 The law institutes
several measures to achieve this aim, including an expedited
timeframe for termination of biological parents' rights 3 ° and finan-
cial rewards to states that significantly increase the number of adop-
tions over previous years.1
3 1
Under ASFA, poor parents-already demonized because they are
unable to financially support their family-must defend against inten-
sified state efforts to terminate their parental rights. Rather than in-
creasing support for poor families, ASFA emphasizes punitive
measures designed to effect behavioral change among parents. Worse
than simple monetary incentives, ASFA uses children as leverage to
encourage a parent's behavioral change. ASFA's stick is the perma-
nent end of the parent's relationship to the child through the termi-
nation of parental rights and adoption. 1
32
This punitive approach is unlikely to have the anticipated effect
on the vast majority of child welfare cases, which involve parental ne-
125. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1999)).
126. DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS 104-13 (2001); see also Bailie, supra note
120, at 2292 (explaining that Congress, prompted by the public response to news stories of
egregious child abuse, passed the ASFA with a new philosophy, one which emphasized
safety over family preservation).
127. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 670 (Supp. V 1999) (stating that the purpose of the ASFA is to
"provide foster care and transitional independent living programs for children"); Bailie,
supra note 120, at 2292-93.
129. Bailie, supra note 120, at 2293 (noting that the ASFA "speeds up the termination of
parental rights and adoption processes"); see also Cahn, supra note 117, at 1197 (stating
"ASFA seeks to prevent children from spending too much time in foster care, and to pro-
mote adoption").
130. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
131. See id. § 673b(d). States receive $4000 for each adoption ($6000 if the adopted
child has "special needs") that exceeds a base level of adoptions the state previously com-
pleted. Id. § 673b(d)(1).
132. See Cahn, supra note 117, at 1202 (noting the punitive nature of ASFA's focus on
adoption).
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glect related to poverty.133 Indeed, neglect is the most common form
of child maltreatment.33 Although this category is intended to cap-
ture only incidents where parents have the ability to provide for their
children and fail to do so, neglect is difficult to disentangle from pov-
erty. 135 Determinants of child neglect such as environmental neglect,
inadequate supervision, inadequate food, inadequate shelter, and in-
adequate clothing clearly reflect the consequences of poverty. 61 3  Crit-
ics of the child welfare system charge that poor parents are often
subject to state intervention solely on account of their economic sta-
tus.'1 3 For these parents, ASFA represents an undeserved reprimand
for a condition that they are unable to change.
I. THE OVERLAP AND CONFLICT BETWEEN SYSTEMS
The welfare and child welfare systems share overlapping histories,
philosophies, and client populations. This overlap often turns into
conflict in the lives of poor families involved in both systems. Dual-
system parents face a double-load of demands and expectations.'3 8
For these parents, the sanctions, work requirements, and time limits
that the TANF program uses to coerce compliance among recipients
are compounded by the requirements of child welfare agencies.'3 9
133. See id. at 1198 (pointing to the link between child neglect and poverty); see also
Jeanne Brooks-Gunn & Greg Duncan, The Effects of Poverty on Children, FUTURE CHILD., Sum-
mer/Fall 1997, at 55, 59 (comparing the percentage of abuse and neglect for poor chil-
dren, 5.4%, to that for nonpoor children, 0.8%).
134. In 1997, 54.7% of the child welfare cases opened nationwide were for neglect, com-
pared to 24.5% for physical abuse and 12% for sexual abuse. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD MALTREATMENT 1997: REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM § 4.2 (1999), available at http://www.acf.dhhs.
gov/programs/cb/publications/ncands97/index.htm [hereinafter CHILD MALTREAT-
MENT]; see also Bailie, supra note 120, at 2294 n.76 (citing the National Clearinghouse on
Child Abuse and Neglect database, which found "that 52 percent of children in the child
protective system [in 1995] were there due to allegations of parental neglect").
135. See PELTON, supra note 2, at 64-66 (discussing a New Jersey case where a welfare
mother's child was removed because of her poverty); see also Bailie, supra note 120, at 2295
(stating that the "agencies .. .are often criticized for confusing poverty with neglect").
136. See Bailie, supra note 120, at 2295; see also ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILY SERVICES, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT-FISCAL YEAR
1999, tbl.11, available at http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/CANTS99Cont.htm (last visited Nov.
30, 2001) (listing the various types of environmental neglect alleged in Illinois).
137. See, e.g., PELTON, supra note 2, at 72 (concluding "[tihe child welfare system ulti-
mately rests upon a foundation of ignorance and poverty, and this is an unjust basis for any
system").
138. See Matthews, supra note 9, at 405 ("Unless welfare and child welfare caseworkers
carefully coordinate their efforts, families involved with both welfare and child welfare




Moreover, welfare reform enforces a standard of ideal motherhood
based on work outside the home that contradicts the emphasis of the
child welfare system on caring for children. 4 ' As a result, many dual-
system families find it more difficult to fulfill the requirements of ei-
ther system.
A. Overlapping Histories
The history of poor support is intimately connected to the devel-
opment of the child welfare system. The first state programs designed
to provide financial support to poor families were intended, in part, to
prevent child maltreatment and neglect and to avoid the need to re-
move children from their destitute mothers.' 4 ' In 1911, Illinois en-
acted the country's first statewide poverty program, called the Fund to
Parents Act.14 2 The act provided public financial assistance to poor
mothers in an effort to ease the burden of child rearing and prevent
child neglect among families without a male breadwinner.' 43 Notably,
the Fund to Parents Act was codified as an amendment to the
landmark Illinois Juvenile Court Act.'4 4 The connection was an easy
one to make, as the juvenile courts already held the responsibility to
care for neglected and dependent children.'45 Still, the concept of
public support to poor mothers became palatable to legislators only
when the parent's poverty was not caused by immoral behavior and
the assistance was explicitly tied to the care of children.'46
States around the country followed Illinois's lead. By 1925, legis-
lators in forty other states had enacted similar "mother's pensions"
legislation.' 47 These laws gave juvenile courtjudges almost boundless
control over the lives of poor mothers. Local judges determined
whether a family deserved state assistance and whether the child
140. See Brito, supra note 98, at 415 (discussing the changing role of the mother in the
context of welfare reform).
141. GORDON, supra note 24, at 37-39.
142. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 33, at 67.
143. Id. President Theodore Roosevelt's 1909 White House Conference on the Care of
Dependent Children recommended the creation of federal poor support. BELL, supra note
32, at 3-5. The conference concluded:
Children of parents of worthy character, suffering from temporary misfortune,
and children of reasonably efficient and deserving mothers who are without the
support of the normal breadwinner should, as a rule, be kept with their parents,
such aid being given as may be necessary to maintain suitable homes for the rear-
ing of children.
Id. at 4.
144. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 33, at 67.
145. Id. at 62-63.
146. See id. at 67-68.
147. Id. at 67.
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should be removed from the parent's home. t 48 Given the prevailing
definition of deservingness, the vast majority of families receiving
poor support were white widows. 149  The "undeserving poor"-
nonwidowed, nonwhite single mothers-were generally denied aid.150
Control over poverty assistance and child welfare remained
largely in the hands of local judges until 1935,151 when Congress
passed the Social Security Act (SSA).1 52 Title IV of the SSA created a
joint federal-state welfare program and initiated the effort to distin-
guish between child poverty and child maltreatment. 153 Little, how-
ever, changed in the administration of the program. Congress
enacted formal "suitable homes" provisions in 1940 that ensured that
ADC recipients would remain primarily white widows. 154
The suitable home eligibility requirements also preserved the
connection between child protection and welfare receipt by allowing
welfare administrators to use child removal as an alternative to finan-
cial assistance.1 55 Only mothers who were deemed fit to raise their
children were given support, while others-primarily minorities and
mothers of "illegitimate" children-risked the denial of aid, the re-
moval of their child, or both.'56 As a result of the suitable home and
"suitable parent" provisions, ADC failed to promote child welfare or
provide cash support for the majority of needy families.1 57
Although legislatively repealed in 1945, the "suitable homes" cri-
teria remained in effect through state-governed policies for another
148. Id. at 68.
149. Id. at 70.
150. JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 25 (1995) ("Excluded outright
were most poor mothers-those who were divorced, deserted, never married, of
color . . ").
151. See id. at 24-25.
152. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601-617 (Supp. V 1999).
153. Frame, supra note 11, at 721. The Children's Bureau, funded under Title V, pro-
vided limited funding for child welfare services. Social Security Act §§ 501-521. Title IV
funded the Aid to Dependent Children program. Id §§ 401-406.
154. See BELL, supra note 32, at 18-19 (discussing the suitable home requirement's effect
on black, unmarried mothers); id. at 35-36 (noting the enactment of the official policy).
155. Frame, supra note 11, at 726 (discussing the historical link between "unsuitability"
and the removal of children, as well as the use of child removal by states "to prevent Afri-
can-American children and those born out of wedlock from receiving funds").
156. Id. at 725-26.
157. BELL, supra note 32, at 176 (indicating that in 1960, while only 30 of every 1000
children in America's "most deprived families" received welfare, 79 of every 1000 belonged
to families whose total income was below $1500 annually).
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fifteen years. 5 ' In 1960, Arthur Flemming, then Secretary of Health
Education and Welfare, issued a ruling (the Flemming Rule) that di-
rected states to abandon the restrictions. 59 Because this shift in pol-
icy left children in truly neglectful homes at risk for continued
maltreatment, Congress amended Title IV of the Social Security Act in
1961 to provide federal funds for children in homes of unemployed
parents and in foster homes.16 0 These amendments established a con-
junction between the funding of federal welfare programs and child
protection programs that continues today.16 Congress created a sepa-
rate foster care program in 1980 under Title IV-E of the Social Secur-
ity Act.162 These federal funds are restricted to families that meet
AFDC eligibility requirements. 163
The PRWORA's replacement of AFDC with a large, free-standing
block grant under TANF affected child welfare funding. For example,
the Emergency Assistance Program that had existed under Title IV-A
was eliminated, and its funds ($1.6 billion in 1995) were rolled into
the TANF block grant.' The PRWORA also reduced the size of the
second largest source of child welfare services funding, the Social Ser-
vices Block Grant (SSBG or Title XX), by fifteen percent.1 6 5 The 1995
federal expenditure on the SSBG was $2.8 billion.'66 Prior to the re-
158. See, e.g., Frame, supra note 11, at 727-28 (citing a 1952 Georgia policy that main-
tamined a "suitable home" provision as indicative of many states and a Louisiana provision
that led to 23,459 children losing ADC funds in 1960).
159. Id. at 728-29.
160. 42 U.S.C. §§ 607-608 (1976) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 672 (1994 & Supp. V
1999)); see also Frame, supra note 11, at 729 (calling the amendments "emergency
legislation").
161. In 1962 the "social service amendments" to the Social Security Act renamed the
ADC program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). See 42 U.S.C. § 601
(1994); HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 33, at 120. AFDC was funded through Title IV-
A of the Social Security Act, which also provided the funding for the federal foster care
program. See 42 U.S.C. § 601.
162. See Cahn, supra note 117, at 1195. Title IV-E provides states with funds for the bulk
of child welfare services, including out-of-home care, casework services for child place-
ment, adoption assistance, and caseworker training. 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679.
163. See Mark E. Courtney, Welfare Reform and Child Welfare Services, in CHILD WELFARE IN
THE CONTEXT OF WELFARE REFORM 1, 4-5 (Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn eds.,
1997). It is important to note that these funds, indexed to 1996 AFDC standards, are not
adjusted for inflation. GEEN & WATERS, supra note 4, at 2; Mark Hardin, Sizing Up Welfare
Reform's Impact on Child Protection, 15 CHILD L. PRAc. 104, 105 (1996). Given that both
incomes and the price of consumer goods inevitably rise with inflation, it is possible that
fewer families will meet these requirements. GEEN & WATERS, supra note 4, at 2. Families
that fail to meet eligibility standards for TANF support may risk contact with the child
welfare system. Id. at 5.




FAMILIES IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM
ductions mandated under the PRWORA, the SSBG provided states
with discretionary funds for child welfare.1 67 The portion spent on
family preservation and child maltreatment prevention likely ex-
ceeded the $442 million directly allocated to these services under Ti-
tle IV-B.' 68 Thus, the SSBG provided an important source of
discretionary funding for child protection and family preservation.
Under TANF, states may continue to use the reduced SSBG funds, as
well as the block grant of federal funds, for these services.69 How-
ever, the creation of a large pool of undirected funds dictates that
there will be an increase in the competition for federal dollars that
were previously applied to child welfare services.170  Because the
TANF block grant is capped and Title IV-E funds for foster care are
not, it is also possible that states have an incentive to shift expendi-
tures away from child-only grants (covered under the TANF block
grant) to foster and kinship care grants (covered under Title IV-E).171
B. Overlapping Client Populations
Although there is no indication in the text or legislative history of
the PRWORA or ASFA, these two laws affect overlapping populations
of families. 172 This connection is rooted in poverty. Poor families are
disproportionately represented among both the TANF and the state
child welfare populations.
1 73
Children raised in poverty are more likely to be reported to child
protective services,'74 more likely to have the report substantiated,
more likely to be removed from the home, and more likely to remain
in substitute care for a longer period of time.'7 ' In the Chicago met-





171. Id. at 6; see also Hardin, supra note 163, at 106 (suggesting that with the increased
availability of federal matching funds, foster care may be used more than necessary).
172. See Cahn, supra note 117, at 1199-1200 (discussing TANF's relationship to ASFA);
see also Matthews, supra note 9, at 395-97 (discussing generally TANF's "complex" relation-
ship to child welfare systems and describing the interplay between the two systems as a
collision").
173. Courtney, supra note 163, at 18.
174. See Matthews, supra note 9, at 396.
175. See Marcia Lowry, Derring-Do in the 1980s: Child Welfare Impact Litigation After the War-
ren Years, 20 FAM. L.Q. 255, 257 (1986) (noting that the majority of foster care children
come from poor households).
Child abuse and neglect happens to children of all races, in all kinds of communi-
ties, in all economic classes. But families of color, and poor families, are more
likely to be identified and coerced into accepting interventions by the child wel-
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poverty threshold are more than three times as likely to become in-
volved with the child welfare system when compared to all other fami-
lies.176  Generally, the incidence of abuse and neglect is
approximately twenty-two times as great for families with annual in-
comes under $15,000, compared to families that earn over $30,000
per year. 77 Poverty, rather than the type or severity of maltreatment,
is the single most powerful predictor of a child's time spent in foster
care. 7 ' These statistics leave "no doubt that the children in foster
care have come predominantly from impoverished families, and that
child abuse and neglect are strongly related to poverty."' 79
The documented relationship between poverty and involvement
in the child welfare system is even more pronounced for children re-
ceiving welfare. Children from families who receive welfare are at the
greatest risk for involvement with the child welfare system due to the
extreme poverty among this population.8s Researchers estimate that
approximately fifty percent of the families referred to the child wel-
fare system received welfare at the time of the referral.'" 1 Neglect, in
particular, is highly associated with past welfare receipt and signifi-
cantly more so than other forms of maltreatment.8 2 In Illinois, forty
percent of the children in foster care came from a family that received
AFDC in the month of the initial case report.' An additional twenty-
six percent of the children in the Illinois foster care population came
from families that had some active AFDC association, but did not re-
ceive an actual cash award.'8 4 These findings leave little doubt that
fare system .... more likely to have their children removed and placed in foster
care, . . . [and] more likely to remain there for long periods of time.
Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law,
36 Aiz. L. REv. 11, 62 n.326 (1994) (quoting A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., A.B.A. PRESIDEN-
TIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES,
AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION 51 (1993)).
176. Shook, supra note 6, at 801.
177. Courtney, supra note 163, at 18.
178. See id. ("Contrary to popular belief, more children are placed in foster care because
of neglect than because of physical and sexual abuse combined.").
179. Leroy Pelton, Child Welfare Policy and Practice: The Myth of Family Preservation, 67 AM.
J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 545, 546 (1997).
180. See Matthews, supra note 9, at 396 (noting the "high correlation" between welfare
eligibility and involvement in the child welfare system).
181. CHRISTINA PAXSON &JANE WALDFOGEL, WORK, WELFARE AND CHILD MALTREATMENT
24 (1999); see PELTON, supra note 2, at 38-39.
182. Bath & Haapala, supra note 2, at 218 (noting that 77% of families with reported
cases of child neglect received public assistance, compared with 36% of families with re-
ported cases of physical abuse).
183. Matthews, supra note 9, at 396.
184. Shook, supra note 2.
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children from families receiving welfare are at an increased risk for
child welfare involvement.
C. Welfare Reform's Impact on Child Welfare Involvement
Because of the strong association between welfare receipt and in-
volvement with child protective services, welfare reform is likely to
have an impact on state child welfare caseloads. There is no definitive
evidence of welfare reform's effect on child welfare. State officials
have pointed to the dramatic decline in welfare rolls nationally in the
last five years as prima facie evidence of welfare reform's success. 85
In Illinois, for example, welfare rolls declined by sixty-three percent
from 1993 to 2000.86 There is evidence, however, that sanctions,
work requirements, and time limits have increased the risk that the
most vulnerable families wiJl become involved with child protective
services. Moreover, it is possible that the successes of welfare-to-work
programs may be reversed as the economy worsens.
1. Sanctions.-Sanctions imposed under TANF may increase the
chances of child welfare involvement1 87 because welfare benefits are
negatively related to neglect (lower welfare benefits yield higher rates
of neglect) and foster care involvement. 188 Sanctioned families neces-
sarily experience income loss, and are therefore more likely to en-
counter a constellation of problems that affect the care of children,
including the ability to provide food, clothing, housing, and pay for
basic utility services. For example, in Illinois, families who had their
welfare grant terminated or reduced by greater than $75 and found
no subsequent employment experienced a significantly greater likeli-
hood of child welfare involvement.88 The overall odds of a family
185. Sanford F. Schram & Joe Soss, Success Stories: Welfare Reform, Policy Discourse, and the
Politics of Research, 577 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc. 49, 50 (2001).
186. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVICES, CHANGE IN TANF CASELOADS STATISTICS,
available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/news/stats/case-fam.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2002).
187. Shook, supra note 6, at 800 (noting that a grant reduction has been shown to in-
crease the odds of child welfare involvement three-fold).
188. Paxson & Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 244 ("[W]e find that socioeconomic circum-
stances. .. affect the incidence of child maltreatment."); see also Leroy H. Pelton, Welfare
Discrimination and Child Welfare, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1487 (1999) (noting that "most
children in foster care come from poverty").
189. Shook, supra note 6, at 800; see also Duncan Lindsey, Adequacy of Income and the Foster
Care Placement Decision: Using an Odds Ratio Approach to Examine Client Variables, 28 Soc.
WORK RES. & ABSTRACTS 29, 34 (1992) (noting that "an unstable income source is the best
predictor of removal of a child and placement in foster care").
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experiencing a case opening or child placement is fifty-three percent
higher for sanctioned grants compared to full grants.' 90
Child exclusion policies that limit the welfare income of recipi-
ents based on the number of children in the family at the time of
initial TANF receipt may also encourage child welfare involvement.' 9 '
Women who resist TANF's efforts to modify their childbirth decisions
face the prospect of raising an additional child with the same welfare
check. For these women, the family cap provisions act as income sanc-
tions upon childbirth. Similarly, minor parents under the age of eigh-
teen are denied cash assistance unless they agree to live with a parent,
adult relative, or legal guardian. 192 These sanctions may affect the re-
cipients' ability to provide adequate child care. 9 3 Thus, sanctions
represent notjust temporary income loss, but also a greater likelihood
of involvement with the child welfare system.'94
Other aspects of TANF's behavior modification scheme are even
more intimately connected to the child welfare system. For example,
TANF terminates awards to parents whose children are removed from
the home for more than forty-five days for any reason, including child
welfare involvement.'95 If reunification is not possible within this pe-
riod, the resultant loss of benefits may lead to hardships such as evic-
tion or termination of utilities that, in turn, interfere with the chances
of reunification.' 96 These families must simultaneously comply with
new rules that TANF imposes while attempting to remedy the circum-
stances that led to their child welfare involvement. Parents may expe-
rience conflicts between compliance with work, training, and
counseling requirements mandated under TANF by welfare
caseworkers and the permanency plan implemented by child welfare
caseworkers.' 97
There are additional aspects of the welfare reform law that are
also likely to draw more families into the child welfare system. The
provision requiring teenaged recipients to live with their parents or
another guardian may have the unintended consequence of increas-
190. Shook, supra note 2.
191. See Risa E. Kaufman, State ERAS in the New Era: Securing Poor Women's Equality by
Eliminating Reproductive-Based Discrimination, 24 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 205-06 (2001)
(stating that such provisions deprive parents of the ability to provide necessary items for
their children, such as food, shelter, and clothing).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (5) (A) (Supp. V 1999).
193. See Shook, supra note 6, at 800 (noting that a grant reduction or sanction increases
the risk of child welfare system involvement).
194. Id.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (10) (A).
196. Matthews, supra note 9, at 400.
197. Id.
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ing contact between these recipients and the child welfare system. 98
Child welfare agencies are better able to place young parents in super-
vised living arrangements and may also be asked to act as outside as-
sessors of private placements.' 99 The prohibition on benefits for
people convicted of drug offenses could also have a substantial impact
on child welfare, given the large proportion of child welfare cases ei-
ther directly or indirectly related to parental drug use.2° ° Substance-
abusing parents who are permanently cut from the welfare rolls will
find it more difficult to care for their children. 20 1 What was conceived
as an attempt to curb drug use among welfare-reliant parents could,
therefore, result in increases in foster care caseloads.
2. Work Requirements.-Welfare reform's impact on child welfare
will depend largely on the availability and quality of employment op-
portunities for recipients who leave the welfare rolls. Research shows
that the type of work many welfare recipients are able to secure can-
not raise their families above the poverty line.20 2 Although eighty per-
cent of the women who voluntarily leave welfare find employment,
2 3
these jobs tend to be in the same types of industries, and with the
same level of pay, as poor and low-income mothers.20 4 Involuntary
welfare "leavers"-those who reach time-limits or are sanctioned-are
at even greater risk for negative outcomes. Only around fifty percent
of the women forced to exit welfare find work.20 5
Research also demonstrates that work-based requirements will sig-
nificantly affect child welfare involvement. Families who leave welfare
and do not find subsequent employment are three times more likely
198. See Hardin, supra note 163, at 106 (pointing out that child protection agencies may
need to determine whether the minor's home presents a danger or to evaluate alternative
acceptable placements for the child).
199. Id.
200. See id. at 107 (noting the large percentage of children entering foster care whose
parents have substance abuse problems); Matthews, supra note 9, at 399 (noting that esti-
mates of the percentage of families involved in child welfare systems with drug or alcohol
problems run as high as 90%).
201. See Matthews, supra note 9, at 399-400 (describing the inadequacy of child welfare
agencies' resources to meet the needs of children with drug-abusing parents).
202. Sandra Danziger et al., Work, Income, and Material Hardship After Welfare Reform, 34J.
CONSUMER AFF. 6, 7 (2000) (noting that "many families who have left welfare remain
poor"); see LoPREST, supra note 5, at 12 (noting that 25% of former welfare recipients
earned below $5.29 an hour in 1997).
203. BRAUNER & LOPREST, supra note 5, at 8.
204. LOPREST, supra note 5, at 10-13.
205. See BRAUNER & LOPREST, supra note 5, at 5, tbl.5 (indicating employment rates for
people who were forced off welfare due to sanctions in Iowa, Tennessee, and Michigan);
id. at 8 (concluding that those who leave welfare as a result of sanctions have lower employ-
ment rates than those who voluntarily leave welfare).
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to become involved with the child protection system than unemployed
families who receive welfare benefits.216 Part-time employment is a
likely effect of welfare reform that is also associated with an elevated
risk of child welfare involvement. Families whose primary caregiver
works part-time are 2.8 times as likely to have a child removed from
the home compared to caregivers who work full-time.2"7 Indeed, un-
stable family income is considered the best predictor of child removal
and foster care placement. 208 By forcing recipients to work, welfare
reform may exacerbate this problem by separating parents from their
children for longer periods of time without adequate child care.20 9
Alternatively, families that are forced off of welfare because of sanc-
tions or time limits may face even more extreme poverty and an in-
creased likelihood of child welfare involvement.210
3. Child Care.-As more mothers are required to work, a com-
mensurate increase in demand for adequate child care is likely to
emerge. Access to child care is considered one of the primary barriers
to welfare-to-work transitions. 211 Welfare recipients have a special
need for child care assistance because they are significantly more
likely to have children with at least one chronic health condition. 212
Coupled with the work demands imposed by TANF, the special char-
acteristics of welfare families make the availability of child care a cru-
cial determinant of welfare reform's impact on children. Sanctions
for noncompliance, in conjunction with sparse child care services for
compliant mothers, makes it likely that the TANF work requirements
may increase the incidence of maltreatment and, particularly, ne-
glect.2 13 The increased need for child care, then, further links child
protective services to welfare reform.
The drafters of the PRWORA did not ignore the need for child
care; in fact, they incorporated programs into the law that provide
206. Shook, supra note 6, at 800.
207. LINDSEY, supra note 2, at 151-52.
208. See id, at 155.
209. See Shook, supra note 6, at 804 (explaining that employment obligations may lead
to unreliable child care arrangements and increased child neglect).
210. See generally BRAUNER & LOPREST, supra note 5, at 5, tbls.4 & 5 (comparing the em-
ployment rates for those who were forced off welfare due to sanctions and those who left
welfare for other reasons, and indicating the lower employment rates for sanctioned
leavers).
211. Barbara Gault et al., Prospects for Low-Income Mothers'Economic Survival Under Welfare
Reform, PUBLIUS, Summer 1998, at 175, 187-90.
212. S. Jody Heymann & Alison Earle, The Impact of Welfare Reform on Parents' Ability to
Care for Their Children's Health, 89 Am.J. PUB. HEALTH 502, 503 (1999).
213. Shook, supra note 6, at 782-83.
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child care assistance to poor mothers. The new Child Care and Devel-
opment Fund (CCDF) was designed to increase the "availability, af-
fordability, and quality of child care services." '214 The new funding
provided by the CCDF is structured to give states greater flexibility in
allocating funds to both the welfare and nonwelfare populations. 215
Poor families who work also receive financial assistance in the form of
the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit, which provides tax reduc-
tions for child care expenses.2 1 6 In addition, the PRWORA does allow
states, at their option, to remove TANF sanctions upon single parents
with a child under the age of twelve months who is unable to meet the
work requirements due to a lack of available child care. 7
Despite these programs, the Congressional Budget Office pro-
jected a shortfall of over $1.8 billion in child care funds for low-in-
come working families by 2002.218 Currently, the number of families
in need of subsidized care far exceed the supply provided by federal
reimbursement programs.219 Approximately one-third of welfare re-
cipients currently below the poverty line would escape poverty if their
child care costs were fully subsidized.220 The dearth of adequate child
care funds means that many welfare recipients will have a difficult
time during the initial transition to work and will likely find it infeasi-
ble to maintain continuous employment for extended periods.22 1 As a
result, it is questionable whether the stated goal of the PRWORA, to
assist families in achieving self-sufficiency, can succeed without in-
creases in federal child care funding.
TANF sends a contradictory message to women involved with the
child welfare system. Dual-system parents are told that they must work
in order to receive assistance and, at the same time, they must care for
their children without adequate child care services. Child care, then,
exemplifies the compound demands placed on dual-system families
and illustrates how being involved with both TANF and the child wel-
fare system makes it more difficult to comply with the requirements of
each individually.
214. Child Care and Development Fund, 45 C.F.R. § 98.1(6) (2000).
215. At least 70% of CCDF funds must be disbursed to families currently receiving wel-
fare, transitioning off of welfare, or at risk of welfare involvement. Id. § 98.50(e).
216. I.R.C. § 21(a)(1) (1994).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 607(b) (5) (Supp. V 1999).
218. Courtney, supra note 163, at 20-21.
219. Gault et al., supra note 211, at 187.
220. Id. at 189.
221. See id. at 187 (explaining that the lack of affordable child care is one reason why




D. The Systems' Competing Demands
Parents involved in both the welfare system and the child welfare
system face a double-load of demands. Dual-system parents must com-
ply with two distinct sets of rules, expectations, and time-consuming
requirements. Despite the overlap in the populations served by the
two programs, states have made little effort to coordinate their behav-
ior-modifying requirements. 222
The combined demands of both TANF and the child welfare sys-
tem have more than a cumulative effect: they place conflicting pres-
sures on the parents. For example, the meeting times of services
required by child welfare agencies may conflict with parents' child
care or work schedules.223 More fundamentally, TANF's emphasis on
paid employment often conflicts with the child welfare system's em-
phasis on parenting.224 According to child welfare scholar Mark
Courtney, "the goals of welfare reform, which is focused on adult self-
sufficiency, compete with the goals of the child welfare system, which
focuses on safe, nurturant child rearing."225
Stephanie Limoncelli, a sociology graduate student at UCLA, dis-
covered striking evidence of the systems' contradictory goals when she
observed a Southern California welfare-to-work program.226
Limoncelli noted the tension between the importance the program's
staff placed on work outside the home and the importance partici-
pants placed on caring for their children. 221 She found that the staff
impressed upon participants the message that they should never ad-
mit to leaving ajob as a result of pregnancy, and that they should not
let their children interfere with their efforts to find and keep ajob.228
The trainers stressed that maternal responsibilities were secondary to
paid work, instructing the mothers not to interrupt their job search to
222. See Mark E. Courtney, The Costs of Child Protection in the Context of Welfare Reform,
FUTURE CHILD., Spring 1998, at 88, 90 (noting the difficulty in discussing "national" welfare
policy given the differences in programs from state to state).
223. See Ward Doran & Roberts, supra note 22, at 58-60 (citing interviews with study
participants who felt overwhelmed by the competing demands of the two systems).
224. See Ellen E. Kisker & Christine M. Ross, Arranging Child Care, FUTURE CHILD., Spring
1997, at 99, 102 (noting that the demands of child care conflict with the demands of
employment).
225. Courtney, supra note 222, at 101.
226. See Stephanie A. Limoncelli, The Politics of Motherhood and Paid Work: Gender,
Class, Race, and the Construction of Need in a Welfare-to-Work Program (2000) (unpub-
lished paper on file with authors).
227. Id. at 17-18.
228. Id.
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care for sick children. 229 They also tried to persuade the mothers that
taking care of children meant providing financial support rather than
spending time with them.23 ° One trainer suggested that participants
impress potential employers by boasting, "I'm a workaholic. I often
stay so late that I neglect my family!
231
Welfare reform's very philosophy-that paid employment is the
test for good parenting and should take precedence over nurturing
children-contradicts the standards for parental rehabilitation set by
child welfare agencies.
III. A STUDY OF DuA SYSTEM FAMILIES: METHODOLODY AND
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
The majority of studies that address the impact of welfare reform
on the child welfare system employ a survey-based methodology.232
These inquiries tend to overlook the individual experiences of dual-
system families in favor of a broad assessment of the child welfare sys-
tem.23  But these aggregate numbers tell us little about the exper-
iences of low-income parents who have been under pressure to both
work and improve their parenting. As a result, few studies are able to
report findings that demonstrate whether or how the personal lives of
families are affected by the new rules imposed under TANF. To un-
derstand how recent behavior modification policies have shaped the
lives of dual-system families, we must look closely at their implementa-
tion by state workers and the experiences of the individuals subject to
regulation. In particular, any valid appraisal of the impact of these
policies must consider their combined effect on poor families.
While statistical analyses of the impact of welfare reform on child
welfare caseloads and outcomes are important, only an in-depth study
of the experiences of families managing both systems can shed light
on the reasons for these outcomes. We therefore undertook a study
designed to move beyond aggregate level welfare and child welfare
statistics by focusing instead upon individual experiences. To accom-
229. See id. at 19 (noting the competing views of mothers, who believe their role is to
take care of their children, and caseworkers, who believe a mother's role is to financially
provide for her children).
230. See id.
231. Id. at 18.
232. See, e.g., LOPREST, supra note 5, at 3 (using data from a national survey conducted by
the National Survey of America's Families); Barbara Needell et al., Transitions from AFDC to
Child Welfare in California, 21 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REv. 815, 815 (1999) (relying on a
survey of AFDC histories of children with birth records, child abuse reporting data, and
foster care data).
233. See LOPREST, supra note 5, at 3; Needell et al., supra note 232, at 815.
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plish this goal, we conducted in-depth interviews of a sample of dual-
system families. This Part describes the selection of our sample, the
methodology we used to collect our data, and the sample's
characteristics.
A. The Sample
The sample for this study was drawn from the Illinois Families
Study conducted by the University Consortium on Welfare Reform.234
The IFS is a longitudinal panel study that will track, over the course of
six years, a random sample of 1400 Illinois families who received wel-
fare benefits in July 1998.25 In addition to an annual panel survey,
the IFS utilizes a data-linking methodology to access information from
a number of state administrative agencies.2 36 As a result, the IFS is
capable of tracking family outcomes over time using both self-reports
and archival state agency data. 37 The goal of the IFS is to assess the
impact of welfare reform in Illinois.23 8
The IFS utilizes a stratified random sampling design.23 9 Stratifica-
tion for the study is based on two geographic areas: Cook County
(containing the Chicago metropolitan area) and the remainder of Illi-
nois. Within each stratum, a systematic sample with a random start
was selected from the grantee populations.24 ° In addition, sample
members were selected using a three-month "rolling" sample strategy
that helped to correct for the potential under-representation of fami-
lies that temporarily had their benefits suspended.24 ' Together, these
sampling strategies identified 1899 eligible TANF grantees.242 Overall
the sample response rate was seventy-two percent, resulting in a sam-
ple size of 1363.243
We conducted interviews with a subset of these parents who both
received a cash assistance grant (TANF) and were involved in the
child welfare system-dual-system families. Approximately ten per-
cent of the 1363 parents interviewed in the IFS had a child who was
234. DAN LEWIS ET AL., UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM ON WELFARE REFORM, WORK, WELFARE
AND WELL-BEING: AN INDEPENDENT LOOK AT WELFARE REFORM IN ILLINOIS (2000).
235. Id. at 5.
236. Id. at 6.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 4.




243. Id. at 11.
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investigated for abuse or neglect subsequent to the sample date.2 4 4
We focus specifically on the families who had an "indicated" allegation
of abuse or neglect-an allegation that was substantiated by credible
evidence. 245 This group comprises five percent of all IFS cases, result-
ing in a potential sample of approximately seventy families.246 Our
sample size fell to forty cases because we could not include families
who refused to grant the IFS access to their administrative data.24 7 Of
these forty cases, we were able to contact and interview sixteen respon-
dents and were unable to interview twenty-four.248 Our qualitative
analysis focuses on this sample of sixteen respondents who were in-
volved with both DCFS and the welfare system. 249
B. Methodology
The qualitative data for this study was obtained through in-depth,
face-to-face interviews with these parents about their experiences with
welfare reform and child protective services. Parents were asked
open-ended questions about their perceptions of the two state agen-
cies and the role the agencies play in their families' lives. Throughout
the interviews, parents were encouraged to express their ideas and
opinions about the two systems, particularly regardingany informa-
tion that was not covered in the interview protocol. 250 The personal
interviews allowed respondents to communicate information that ex-
tends beyond simple background characteristics, revealing a truly in-
dividual perspective on these two state-directed systems. Coupled with
the IFS survey, this qualitative research design provided detailed infor-
mation about families' experiences and about the dynamics of the in-
teraction of the child welfare and welfare systems in families' lives. 2 1
Interviews began in the Summer of 2000 and were completed that
Fall.252 Interviews lasted forty-five to sixty minutes.2 5 3
244. Ward Doran & Roberts, supra note 22, at 24. This study selected families based on
their involvement with child protection services beginning in July 1998, the start date for
IFS interviews. A total of 14% of the IFS families had child protection involvement prior to
the sample selection in 1998. Id. at 25 n.3.
245. Id. at 25.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. Although these families completed IFS surveys, their contact information had
changed in the period between the survey and our interviews. As a result, we could not
locate them. All of the parents who we were able to contact consented to be interviewed.
Id. at 25 n.4.
249. Id. at 25.
250. Id.
251. Id.




Descriptive information for our sample (n=16) is presented in
Appendix 1.254 Because our sample is really a subset of all dual-system
families, this table also gives descriptive characteristics for the dual-
system parents we were unable to contact (n=24) 255 and the IFS sam-
ple as a whole (n=1,363). Appendix 1 displays the unweighted case
counts, weighted means, and weighted standard deviations for the
three groups.256
As would be expected from a sample of families receiving welfare,
almost all of the individuals in our sample were women (n=15). A
disproportionate number of our respondents were black (n=12) due
to large black populations in two of the sampling locations, Chicago
and East St. Louis. The remaining four respondents were white. We
had no Hispanic families in our sample. The majority of respondents
had never been married (n=7), though a large minority were either
currenfly married (n=4) or divorced or widowed (n=5). The average
weighted age for respondents was 29 years old (sd=5.45). Chicago res-
idents made up 43.8% of the interview sample (n=7), with the remain-
ing 56.2% (n=9) living in East St. Louis and Peoria. While most
respondents had an educational attainment of high school, GED, or
beyond (n=9), 43.8% of the respondents (n=7) had neither graduated
high school nor earned the GED. The families in our sample aver-
aged five children (sd=2.16). Six families had four children or less
and ten families had five or more children. The number of children
per family was one of the three demographic variables that differed
significantly (p<.05) between the interview sample (n=16) and the
noninterview sample (n=24). Families that were interviewed tended
to have more children (p<.05).
In addition to the demographic characteristics of the interview
sample, Appendix 1 also presents information regarding the respon-
dents' public assistance receipt. Almost all of the families in our sam-
ple received the three main benefits associated with welfare, measured
253. Id.
254. See Appendix 1.
255. Id. As noted above, the predicted number of dual-system families was seventy. Ap-
proximately thirty of these families did not give consent to examine their administrative
records, so we could not include them in the study. Id.
256. To determine whether the respondents we were able to interview differed signifi-
candy from the respondents who we could not interview, we conducted a series of bivariate
analyses. Only three variables differed significantly between the two groups. The interview
group had significantly more children (p<.05), experienced homelessness more often, and
were more likely to change residences than the noninterview group (p<.05).
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as receipt in 1998.257 Specifically, 93.8% of the interview sample re-
ceived Food Stamps (n=15), 81.3% of the sample received Medicaid
(n=13), and 81.3% of the sample received cash assistance through
TANF (n=13). Most respondents (n=14) had not been sanctioned by
the TANF office in the year prior to their participation in the survey.
We found no significant differences for public assistance receipt based
on whether the respondent was interviewed or not.
Because all of the families in both the interview sample and the
greater IFS sample are poor, we used homelessness and residential
change to assess relative levels of poverty.258 As shown in Appendix 1,
15% of the interview sample respondents (n=6) were homeless in the
twelve months prior to their IFS survey. Homelessness did differ be-
tween the respondents who were interviewed and those who were not,
with the interviewed parents significantly more likely to have been
homeless (p<.05). Similarly, the number of times each respondent
changed residences in the past year differed significantly between the
two groups (p<.05). In our sample of interviewed families, respon-
dents tended to have moved less than two times (n=14), with 12.5% of
the sample (n=2) having moved three times or more.
IV. TRYING TO MEET THE COMPETING DEMANDS OF Two SYSTEMS
Because we selected our sample of parents based on their dual-
system status, we anticipated that they would provide unique insight
into the connection between the welfare and child welfare systems.
We found that perceptions of the ties between the welfare system and
the child welfare system were not at the forefront of the parents'
minds.259 Very few parents explicitly identified the overlap between
the two systems. 26 ° However, during the course of the interviews, par-
ents identified several important connections and conflicts between
these two systems.
Our study revealed three types of conflicts that dual-system par-
ents experienced in trying to meet the expectations of both TANF and
child protective services. First, TANF's expectation that parents work
without adequate child care made it difficult for parents to care for
257. The three main sources of welfare are: Food Stamps, Medicaid, and cash assistance.
SeeJoel F. Handler, Women, Families, Work, and Poverty: A Cloudy Future, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S
L.J. 375, 419 (1996).
258. Although the IFS does include several income variables, the response rate for these
questions was very low. As a result, we could not use actual income as an indication of
poverty.




their children. Second, TANF's sanctions and time limits deprived
parents of the resources needed to comply with the child welfare sys-
tem's requirements. Third, parents found it logistically difficult to
comply simultaneously with TANF requirements and their child wel-
fare services case plan.
A. Child Care and Work Requirements
The availability of adequate child care is critical for parents at-
tempting to meet the demands of welfare reform. Parents without
access to adequate child care find it extremely difficult to simultane-
ously comply with the work requirements imposed under TANF and
care for their children. 261 They must secure satisfactory child care or
risk sanctions for missing work and possible involvement with the
child welfare system.262 Indeed, the parents we interviewed indicated
that a lack of child care was the main reason why they were unable to
exit the welfare rolls.2 63 Without adequate child care, the parents in-
terviewed found it difficult to maintain ajob while trying to raise their
children.
The initial problem that many parents had with child care was
locating a trusted provider. Christina, a thirty-three-year-old African-
American single mother we interviewed, recently found ajob that she
enjoyed and that helped her to leave public assistance. 264 Because she
was unable to find help caring for her children, however, Christina
eventually missed several days of work. As a result, she lost her job
and is again receiving welfare. Christina cites child care as the princi-
pal deterrent to her ability to maintain employment.265 Her "consis-
tent problem" with getting off of welfare has been "being able to hold
down a job while raising kids. ' 2 6 6 Like Christina, Kimberly, a thirty-
two-year-old white divorced mother, was told by her public aid worker
to find a job, but could not find a babysitter because "everyone
works." 26 7 As a result, she is only able to look for work while her chil-
dren are at school.
261. Id.; see alsoJennifer Preston, Welfare Rules Intensify Need for Day Care, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
11, 1996, at BI (discussing the link between inadequate child care options and welfare
receipt).
262. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(e) (Supp. V 1999) (setting out the possible penalties if a welfare
recipient does not comply with the work requirements).
263. Ward Doran & Roberts, supra note 22, at 63-64.
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Finding child care is especially difficult for parents who have
housing problems. Shelters, for example, often do not provide this
service. 2 6 8 Because families that lack adequate housing may be forced
to relocate on a daily basis, they cannot secure a regular child care
arrangement. 269 For example, Angela, a thirty-four-year-old African-
American single mother, needs to hire a babysitter so she can increase
the hours at her job. "But I just moved here. I don't know many
people [who would be available to baby-sit]," she reported.2 v° Angela
now plans to wait until her oldest daughter is able to care for the
younger children before she transitions to full-time employment.271
Like many parents, Angela rejected the child care workers pro-
vided by the public aid office. "I'm really not trusting in the Depart-
ment of Public Aid's babysitters so I have to find one,"272 she
explained. "I just don't trust the people that they pick. They have a
list of people that they, like, want [you] to pick from, but I want to
find my own sitter."
2 71
Even if a parent is able to find a trustworthy child care provider,
there are often problems with the state's payments for this care. Sev-
eral parents mentioned that their TANF grant provided cash assis-
tance for child care. 274 However, this money is not disbursed at the
same time the service is provided. According to Kelly, a twenty-nine-
year-old African-American mother who is separated from her hus-
band, the public assistance child care program is problematic because
it "takes so long to get [the babysitters] their money-like 2 or 3
months. They want their money right then and there.' 275 Beverly, a
thirty-six-year-old African-American divorced mother, also found that
it was very difficult to obtain child care because the public assistance
system takes so long to pay the providers. 276 She said that she had to
pay out of her pocket until the system started paying. Further, Beverly
explained that child care providers must navigate an extensive appli-
cation process to qualify for TANF funds. She believed this deters
many providers from signing up with the public assistance program.
268. Id.; see also Shannon Wright, Out of Sight, But Not Out of Mind, Hous. CHRON., Aug.
23, 1998, at A19 (indicating that one of the hurdles in getting out of a homeless shelter is
the high cost of child care).
269. Ward Doran & Roberts, supra note 22, at 63-64.









Beverly experienced other delays with the public aid office, such as
the time it sent a form back to her three times because they could not
read her signature.277
Respondents also reported that problems with transportation af-
fect their ability to arrange adequate child care and, therefore, to
work. 278 A number of parents indicated that their inability to trans-
port caregivers to their home, or their children to the caregiver, had
resulted in sporadic child care for their children, causing them to miss
work.2 7 When asked about her experiences finding child care, Sally,
a twenty-four-year-old white single mother, replied "it's hard 'cause I
don't have any way to get [my son] to [the child care center]."28
Sally did try to find a private caregiver, but none she contacted pro-
vided their own transportation. As a result, Sally had trouble holding
ajob and currently is not working.281 Without the ability to transport
themselves and their children to and from child care, parents must
sometimes subordinate their need to work to the greater need to se-
cure their child's well-being. Sally stated that her son is "number one.
But then my job's [also] number one, because I got to have a job to
take care of him."282
B. Sanctions, Time Limits, and Parents' Compliance with Child
Welfare Requirements
Poverty binds the two welfare programs and affects parents' abil-
ity to comply with child welfare requirements. 28 3 Parents without the
resources to provide important necessities for their family face the risk
of a child welfare report for neglect.28 4 As noted above, most child
maltreatment cases stem from neglect, which is intimately connected
to poverty.28 5 Not surprisingly, the parents we interviewed face tre-
mendous financial pressures. Although the majority of the respon-
dents reported some form of employment, the part-time nature of the
work limits both the hours and the wages available. In addition, the
types of retail and "pink collar" jobs that these parents secure are un-
likely to provide important and costly benefits, such as medical
277. Id.
278. Id. at 38.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 39.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 66.
284. Id.
285. Id.; see also supra notes 133-137 and accompanying text (discussing poverty's link to
many maltreatment cases).
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care.28 6 Of the parents we interviewed who were working, most work
as part-time cashiers at retail stores or as telemarketers. 2 87 Several par-
ents either work, or were in training for work, in nursing homes. 28 8
For those respondents not working and receiving cash assistance
alone, the monthly benefits were often insufficient to pay both rent
and utilities.28 9
Brenda, a thirty-six-year-old African-American single mother who
works and also receives supplementary cash assistance, finds that the
money she receives from public aid is simply not enough to meet her
own needs and those of her five children: "I just make do with what I
have. The toughest part is paying the bills. When it comes to paying
the bills and there's not enough money, you're looking at the kids
and they want this and they want that and you can't get them what
they want. '2 0° Paying bills and rent means that other needs go unmet.
Brenda expressed deep concern with the costs associated with her
children's schooling:
Me and a couple people at my job was talking, and we didn't
understand why come when school getting ready to start,
why come they don't give people allowances to buy school
clothes. Because that's a lot especially when women are sin-
gle and they have to buy school clothes. 'Cause all of mine
are sitting up wondering where their school clothes at. They
won't get none .... By the time I get done paying bills, I
don't have no money to buy school clothes.... One month
you might have to let all the bills go to have enough money
to buy school clothes.29 1
Although Brenda has a job, her cash assistance is cut each time
she receives a raise in salary. As a result, over the past four years
Brenda's monthly grant has been reduced from $529 to $340 to its
current level-100. 29 2 Like many of the respondents we interviewed,
Brenda has trouble paying both the rent and her bills. "Once I pay
286. See Greg Duncan et al., How Different Are Welfare and Working Families? And Do These
Differences Matter for Children's Achievement?, in FOR BETTER AND FOR WORSE: WELFARE RE-
FORM AND THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 103, 104 (G. Duncan & P. Lindsay
Chase-Lansdale eds., 2002).








the rent," she confided, "I'm broke. I can't pay the whole [electricity]
bill."2
93
Financial problems of this sort are echoed by all of the respon-
dents, those working and those who are not. While public aid benefits
such as Food Stamps and Medicaid make an important contribution
to their lives, the combined assistance-even coupled with paid em-
ployment-is not enough to raise these parents out of poverty. As a
result, these parents face an ongoing struggle to provide for their chil-
dren's basic daily needs. After paying for rent, most parents we inter-
viewed found providing enough food to be a daunting task.2 94
Cynthia, a forty-year-old white working mother who is widowed
with two children, receives Food Stamps and Medicaid, but no cash
grant. These benefits alone do not provide the level of support that
she needs to feed her family.
295
Try feeding a teenager on $140 a month. I don't even make
it through the month. I mean, they go through a gallon of
milk every 2 days, a loaf of bread every day practically. Ya
know. I mean I get [money on my link card] 296 on the first,
and I buy .... I usually spend it all. I get all my meals and
everything, 'cause I seem to get more if I do it that way than
if I just get it everyday or whatever. Although I usually have
enough meat and stuff to last me a month, but I run out of
milk and bread and eggs and all that. There's no money.
Then I beg and borrow off of everybody. I mean, it's terri-
ble. I'm gonna get another job.297
Like Cynthia, many of the respondents expressed concern about their
ability to provide their children with adequate food. Other common
child-rearing expenses, such as a trip to the movies, a bowling arena,
or a skating rink, are considered prohibitive "luxuries" that "put a real
damper on your pocket."
298
Paid employment, either current or anticipated, is a major com-
ponent of these parents' lives. 299 Every respondent indicated a prefer-
ence for earning an income. Those respondents who were already
working emphasized getting a better job with higher pay."°° Those
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tion and training in order to get ajob. °' In addition to the financial
benefits of employment, the parents we interviewed perceived work as
a means to transition into the legitimate world.3 ° 2 According to An-
gela, work represents normalcy. "And then I would see other people
working and, you know, doing stuff like normal people do," Angela
said. "And I wanted to be a normal, productive member of society just
like them." ' 3 On the other hand, many parents who indicated a pref-
erence for work also expressed a concomitant fear that earning in-
come would affect their cash benefits, Food Stamps, and medical
coverage.3°4 They perceived work, while desirable, to have serious
costs that make it difficult to provide food and medical care to their
children. They also noted several impediments to finding and main-
taining employment, including inadequate or unavailable housing,
lack of access to transportation, and inaccessible child care.
30 5
The income strain associated with welfare sanctions and time lim-
its can force parents into deeper levels of poverty. Brenda had to
meet only one requirement to close her DCFS case-pay her electric-
ity bill. Though Brenda both works and receives a cash grant, she
cannot afford to pay her utility bills, which prevents her from comply-
ing with DCFS demands. 0 6 As a result of her poverty, she risks contin-
ued involvement with the child welfare system.
The threat of sanctions exerted a very real influence on the ac-
tions and behaviors of the parents we interviewed. 30 7 All of the par-
ents we interviewed identified the need to work to avoid sanctions as
the principal message of welfare reform.30 8 The parents experienced
this message in a variety of ways. Beverly is required to submit a "quar-
terly report form" to her public aid office. 0 9 While this form may be
mailed in to the aid office, Beverly hand delivers it for fear that "they
will say it was lost in the mail." i0 She is also required to participate in
the Illinois Job Search program, under which she must turn in ten to
twenty job applications per month, each signed by the potential em-
ployer.3 11 Justin, a thirty-nine-year-old African-American unmarried
301. Id.
302. Id. at 32-33.
303. Id. at 33.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 34.
306. Id. at 66.
307. Id. at 42.






father, was working eighteen hours per week, but his caseworker said
that he needed to work forty hours or risk losing his benefits. 312 Like
other respondents, Justin explained that if he could not find a job
with enough hours, he was required to work in the TANF office forty
hours per week.3 13
Shirley, a twenty-nine-year-old African-American single mother,
has never been sanctioned and does her best to avoid the possibility.
"I've did everything that they asked me. And I can't really afford to be
sanctioned by me having eight kids, you know." '3 1 4 To avoid sanctions
she fills out job search forms, forwards copies of her rent receipts to
the TANF office, and arrives on time for all of her TANF office ap-
pointments. "If you're not there on time and stuff... don't expect
for the check or the stamps to be on your link card 'cause they won't.
They hurry up and cut you fast!" Shirley continued, "say you probably
just forgot about the appointment. They ain't tryin' to hear that.
They just cut you off. 3 15
Dual-system parents must cope with even greater financial pres-
sures from the welfare reform law than other recipients. The
PRWORA mandates that children must live in the recipient's home in
order for the parent to receive TANF benefits. 316 When children are
removed from the home, for any reason, the TANF benefits terminate
after forty-five days. 317 Although most parents involved with DCFS re-
3181hstain custody of their children, parents whose children are removed
from the home face the possible termination of their welfare benefits.
The sudden end to welfare receipt can have devastating effects. Glo-
ria, a thirty-one-year-old African-American married mother, lost all of
her TANF benefits when her children were taken into DCFS custody.
"I felt like my life fell apart when they took my kids, 3 19 she recalled.
Gloria's TANF termination raised substantial direct and indirect barri-
ers to her ability to cope with the loss of her children. Because public
aid terminated her cash grant, Gloria also lost her home and became
homeless. In desperation, she turned to drugs for solace. Two years
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 42.
315. Id. at 42-43.
316. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (1) (Supp. V 1999).
317. Id. § 608(a)(10)(A).
318. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT-FISCAL YEAR 1999, tbl.27 (2000), available at http://
www.state.il.us/dcfs/CANTS99Cont.htm (stating that only six percent of reported cases in
Illinois ended in the child being taken into protective custody).
319. Ward Doran & Roberts, supra note 22, at 65.
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elapsed before Gloria was able to quit using drugs, find a new home,
and regain custody of her children.3 20
Like Gloria, Rhonda, a thirty-four-year-old African-American di-
vorced mother, was receiving welfare at the time of the DCFS report.
Although her children were placed in the custody of her father, the
public aid office terminated her TANF benefits.321 Her father had to
contact the public aid office and have the children's grants trans-
ferred to him while he was taking care of the children. He did not
begin to receive the children's cash assistance for two weeks. Rhonda
lost benefits for one month.322 Justin also had all of his welfare bene-
fits terminated after his children were removed and was unable to pay
his medical bills. 23
The TANF rules often conflict with other aspects of recipients'
lives that might improve their children's welfare. To keep receiving
assistance, Shirley is required to attend GED classes.3 24 Although she
would like to earn her GED, she is concerned that if she misses classes
she will be sanctioned. In addition to her school requirements, Shir-
ley must obtain ten signatures from potential employers. 25 "They
give these lists where we gotta go out and look for jobs, and get the
paper signed-like ten signatures saying that you was out there
lookin' for one." 326 Shirley is optimistic about her job opportunities
once she completes her GED.32 7
Despite its popularity among legislators, few respondents dis-
cussed the child exclusion policy, or "family cap," a behavior modifica-
tion technique designed to discourage women from having additional
children while on welfare. 328 Our interviews suggest that the decision
to bear children is more complicated than the simple cost-benefit
analysis advanced by proponents of family caps. Rhonda's description
reflects the complexity of women's decision making:
And I don't think it's fair that... they don't give you cash









328. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing the family cap's affect on
families). Under child exclusion policies, mothers who currently receive welfare benefits
and give birth to a child do not receive an increase in the amount of their grant. Williams,
supra note 23, at 736.
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not stopping the problem of women having babies. See, be-
cause there's a lot of people in different situations. And
there's a lot of times people have been down for so many
years just by being in relationships, or just adjusting to living
a certain type of way in poverty, or however you may put it,
and then they don't have the self-esteem or the ability ... or
have enough pride to say that I want to change. You
know... a lot of people have a lot of issues. You know, and
they need to see that . . . like a lot of people need to be
counseled from, you know, being raped for years, or having
loss or grievances, you know loss of a loved one-a baby, a
husband, or whatever. It's a lot. People can have mental...
incapabilities. [Welfare reformers] don't know. And they
need to find out first before they be quick to say "well, you've
been on this for this amount of time and we're gonna...
[cut you off]." They should really look into things like that.
'Cause there's a lot of people that need help that don't know
how to get it!3
29
Rhonda's observations are supported by empirical studies that
find no relationship between the level of welfare benefits and out-of-
wedlock births."3 ° Moreover, the fact that Rhonda was the only re-
spondent who mentioned family caps suggests that these provisions do
not influence recipients' decisions about childbearing to the extent
that legislators predicted.
C. Balancing the Requirements of TAME and DCFS
As we discussed in Part II, parents involved in both the welfare
system and the child welfare system must comply with two distinct sets
of rules, expectations, and time-consuming requirements. They must
balance the requirement to work or obtain schooling imposed by
TANF, coupled with the requirement to attend parenting classes, fam-
ily counseling, and drug treatment imposed by DCFS, against the de-
mands of raising their children.
329. Ward Doran & Roberts, supra note 22, at 50-51.
330. See KRISTIN LUKER, DUBIOUS CONCEPTIONS: THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE PREGNANCY
126-27 (1999). As Kristin Luker has explained:
If welfare encouraged early and out-of-wedlock childbearing, we would expect
states with more generous benefits... to have more such childbearing, and stingy
states to have less. But a number of comparative studies have demonstrated that
there is no correlation between the level of benefits and the level of out-of-wed-
lock births.
Id.; see also Lens, supra note 62, at 27-30 (citing several studies that show no correlation
between receiving welfare and out-of-wedlock pregnancies).
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Many of the dual-system parents we interviewed felt overwhelmed
by the time consuming nature of the combined requirements im-
posed by TANF and DCFS and found it difficult to comply with both
sets of requirements.331 In addition, parents indicated that the combi-
nation of DCFS and TANF requirements interferes with the demands
of raising children.33 2 The conflict between DCFS requirements and
TANF work requirements is evident in Brenda's response to her DCFS
caseworker's request that she meet additional requirements: "I work
five days a week, just like you do. What you want me to do-take off
from my job to do certain things? I told you I can only do it after
hours."333
Michelle, a twenty-three-year-old African-American single
mother, believes that the services DCFS requires make it difficult for
her to both work and get her children back. She feels that she is be-
ing forced to choose between these two competing goals. Child wel-
fare services seem to consume all of her time. DCFS requires her to
participate in parenting classes, substance abuse classes, counseling-
"you name it. As you go, they make up stuff [for you to take] .""
These service requirements demand so much time that Michelle has
not been able to keep a job.335
Michelle's experiences illustrate how the time demands of DCFS
requirements can conflict with the work requirements imposed by
TANF. She felt torn between the two systems because she must attend
the DCFS meetings and services to regain custody of her children.336
"I have to go to the meetings with my kids and the services, 337
Michelle said.
They inhibit me from working. I have to go to the meeting
with my kids rather than work because if I don't, they (the
caseworkers) will make it seem like I don't love my kids.
They can say anything they want .... I have no say so, I'm
just standing there [in court] .338
Although she makes her children her top priority, Michelle rec-
ognizes that this focus may have long-term implications for her TANF
benefits. If she does not find employment because of her compliance
331. Ward Doran & Roberts, supra note 22, at 66.
332. Id.
333. Id.







with DCFS requirements, she risks reaching the time limit for receipt
of her cash grant. Without this cash assistance, inadequate housing or
her inability to provide adequate food and clothing could compro-
mise Michelle's reunification with her children.339
Thus, the conflict between TANF requirements and DCFS re-
quirements may create a cyclical pattern of failure. Each program's
requirements may force a behavioral compromise, such as forgoing
work to attend parenting classes or vice versa, that could eventually
result in the loss of TANF benefits or child custody.34 ° Despite this
possibility, the emphasis on caring for their children over the poten-
tial loss of TANF benefits was common among the parents we inter-
viewed. 4 ' The desire to keep or regain custody of their children
controls these parents' decisions. Indeed, some parents failed to per-
ceive clear conflicts between TANF and DCFS requirements because
the drive to care for their children made the TANF requirements
seem insignificant. 42
For example, Gloria responded to a question about the conflict
between the two systems by stating that there was none: "My children
are most important."3413 This response was particularly surprising
given that Gloria has had problems meeting her TANF requirements
since she became involved with DCFS. The child welfare service re-
quirements have forced her to miss several appointments with her
TANF caseworker.3 44 She noted that "if you are late or miss an ap-
pointment they take your whole benefits out. Then you be like late on
rent and everything."345 Gloria felt that this sanction was unfair be-
cause the only appointments that she ever missed were due to services
required by DCFS. She was willing to sacrifice her welfare benefits to
perform the tasks that the child welfare system required. This strat-
egy, however, may have negative long-term consequences if the loss of
TANF benefits reduces her ability to provide necessities to her chil-
dren, thereby making her family vulnerable to further DCFS
intervention. 46
In addition, parents living with their children indicated that it was
difficult to balance the general demands of raising children with the
TANF requirements. Shirley noted that she "doesn't have much time
339. Id.
340. Id. at 67.
341. Id. at 67-68.
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for anything., 34 7 Angela also feels that she has too much to balance.
She tries to coordinate her public aid appointments with her work
schedule. Because she works in the evening, she tries to make all of
her appointments with her caseworker in the late morning after she
helps her children get to school.34 8 By default, the requirements end
up "balanc[ing] [them]selves ''349 because she can only work during
those times when she is not caring for her children or meeting with
her caseworker. Sally also had difficulty balancing the demands of
caring for her son and paid work. "I've got a lot of things to do. Like
right now, getting [my son] involved in school, getting his school sup-
plies, he's got doctor's appointments, and all that stuff. If I would be
working right now, that would interfere in my work. So, yeah, some-
times [public aid] would help out.'"350
CONCLUSION
Both the welfare and child welfare systems impose behavior modi-
fication requirements on poor parents based on the assumption that
family problems are caused by parental deficiencies. Although these
two systems share overlapping histories, populations, and philoso-
phies, they impose competing-and often conflicting-demands on
the families that are involved in both. Our study revealed that fami-
lies' involvement in TANF and child protective services stemmed
largely from external constraints that make it difficult for poor par-
ents to care for their children, including barriers to well-paid jobs,
lack of affordable child care and housing, and transportation
problems. The two systems' conflicting behavior-modification re-
quirements, moreover, further impede parents' ability to conform to
the expectations of either system. The dual-system parents we inter-
viewed reported that TANF's expectation that they keep ajob without
adequate child care made it harder to take care of their children; that
TANF's sanctions and time limits increased their financial insecurity;
and that they found it extremely difficult to comply simultaneously
with TANF requirements and their child protective services case plan.
More fundamentally, despite their enthusiasm for finding paid em-
ployment, they experienced a conflict between TANF's rules and the
general demands of raising children.
This study demonstrates that welfare reform has failed to provide




350. Id. at 68-69.
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competing demands of keeping a job and caring for their children.
The conflict dual-system families experience suggests a problem with
TANF's behavior-modification philosophy as well. By focusing on re-
forming parental deficiencies, the welfare and child welfare systems
overlook the societal causes of child poverty and maltreatment. To-
gether, they place unmanageable burdens on the most desperate par-
ents to improve their children's welfare without the tools they need.
As Gwendolyn Mink observes, "Wy we end welfare dictates how we
end it-whether we end it by subordinating poor single mothers or by
improving their prospects for equality."35 The experiences of fami-
lies in the child welfare system invite Congress to re-think behavior
modification as the reason and method for reforming welfare.
351. MINK, supra note 54, at 134.
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